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Legal Aspects in Establishing the Internal Market for services 
 
Vassilis Hatzopoulos 
 
 
The internal market for services is one of the objectives set by the founding fathers of the EC 
back in 1957. It is only in the last ten-fifteen years, however, that this aspect of the internal 
market has seriously attracted the attention of the EC legislature and judiciary.1 With the 
exception of some sector-specific directives dating back in the late ‘80s, it is only with the 
deregulation of network industries, the development of electronic communications and the 
spread of financial services, in the ‘90s that substantial bits of legislation got adopted in the 
field of services. Similarly, the European Court of Justice (ECJ, the Court) left the principles 
established in Van Binsbergen back in 1973, hibernate for a long time before fully applying 
them in Säger and constantly thereafter.2 Ever since, the Court’s case law in this field has 
grown so important that it has become the compulsory starting point for any study concerning 
the (horizontal) regulation of the internal market in services. The limits inherent to negative 
integration and to the casuistic approach pursued by judiciary decisions have prompted the 
need for a general legislative text to be adopted for services in the internal market. This text, 
however, hotly debated both at the political and at the legal level, has ended up in little more 
than a complex restatement of the Court’s case law. It may be, however, that this ‘little more’ 
is not that little.  
In view of the ever expanding application of the Treaty rules on services, promoted by the 
ECJ (para. 1),3 the Directive certainly appears to be a limited regulatory attempt (para. 2). 
This, however, does not mean that the Directive is a toothless, or useless regulatory 
instrument (conclusion: para. 3). 
 
1. An ever expanding application of the Treaty rules: the case law of the ECJ 
 
1.1. A large definition of the concept 
 
In the EC Treaty (Article 50) services are defined in a negative manner, as being all ‘services  
[…] where they are normally provided for remuneration, in so far as they are not governed by 
the provisions relating to freedom of movement for goods, capital and persons.’ This is an 
empirical definition given at a time when services only played a residual economic role. 
However, the subsequent development of the service economy, the diversification of existing 
services and, most importantly, the creation of new ones – enhanced by new technologies –, 
have radically changed the economic reality from the one prevailing in 1957.  
This ‘service revolution’ needed be reflected in the way the Treaty rules are applied. This task 
has been taken up by the Court which, in its recent case law, has revolutionised all three 
elements of the definition given in Article 50 of the EC Treaty: the concept of services itself 
(1.1.1), the existence of remuneration (1.1.2) and the ‘residual’ relationship with the other 
Treaty freedoms (1.1.3). 
 
1.1.1. The concept of services: a conceptual stretch  
 
The Court has considerably stretched the concept of services, in three ways: it has 
recognised that future or even virtual services may benefit from the Treaty rules (1.1.1.1), it 
has increasingly applied the Treaty rules to services which have hereto been excluded from 
their scope (1.1.1.2) and it has extended the application of the Treaty rules in cases where 
there is no clear extraterritorial element (1.1.1.3).   
 
1.1.1.1. Virtual – Future services 
 
                                                          
1 It is telling, in this respect, that the first ever edited volume on services in the internal market only appeared in 2001, 
see M. Andenas and W.-H. Roth (Eds.), Services and Free Movement in EU Law (2001) OUP, Oxford.  
2 Case C-76/90 Säger [1991] ECR I-4221. 
3 For a more extensive and systematic presentation of the same case law see V. Hatzopoulos and U. Do, ‘The Case 
Law of the ECJ Concerning the Free Provision of Services: 2000-2005’ (2006) CMLRev 923-991; the analysis here 
follows to some extent the structure of this earlier article, but is far more condensed. 
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When the Court decided, in Alpine Investments,4 that the mere existence of virtual cross 
border recipients of services, was enough for Article 49 EC to apply, many writers were 
dismayed.5 However, seven years later, in the Carpenter case,6 the Court took a much bolder 
step in this respect. It held that Mr. Carpenter, whose profession entailed ‘selling advertising 
space in medical and scientific journals and offering various administrative and publishing 
services to the editors of those journals’ was a service provider in the Art 50 EC sense of the 
term, since many of his clients were established in other Member States. The Court was 
satisfied that this was so a) despite the fact that the bulk of Mr. Carpenter’s services were 
provided to his overseas clients without him having to move there and b) without the Court 
identifying any specific cross-border service actually provided by Mr. Carpenter.  This 
preliminary finding of the Court seems to confirm that the existence of virtual service 
recipients in other Member States is enough for Article 49 EC to come into play.  
This point was taken further in Omega.7 The referring Court acknowledged that the prohibition 
of the ‘play to kill’ game could frustrate the leasing contracts for machinery, that Omega had 
concluded with an undertaking established in the UK, thus limiting its freedom to receive 
services (and possibly goods). The Court was not impressed by the fact that, at the date of 
the adoption of the contested measure, no contract had been concluded between the parties, 
since the contested ‘order is capable of restricting the future development of contractual 
relations between the two parties’.8 Therefore, not only virtual but also future services fall into 
the ambit of Article 49 EC, provided that, in view of the specific facts of each case, they are 
likely to materialize.  
 
1.1.1.2. Bringing ‘excluded’ services under Article 49 EC 
 
Transport services 
 
Transport services are subject to the specific Treaty rules (Articles 70-80 EC) and to 
secondary legislation adopted for their application. Hence, they evade the application of 
Article 49 EC. The ensuing Regulations 4055/869 and 2408/9210 have been held by the Court 
to fully transpose the free movement principles to maritime and air-transport services, 
respectively.11 It is, therefore, striking that in the last five years only the Court had to deal with 
no less than six cases, involving four Member States, where it applied Article 49 EC next to 
the sector specific rules. Hence, in Commission v. Italy, embarkation tax12 the Italian republic 
was condemned, under both Regulation 4055/86 and Article 49, for applying differential taxes 
to passengers travelling between domestic ports, and those travelling to a non Italian 
destination. In Sea Land,13 the Court accepted that, in a similar vein to Article 49 EC, the 
Regulation provisions could be invoked by an undertaking against its own State of origin.14 In 
Geha,15 concerning vessels voyaging to Turkey, the Court combined the material rule of 
Article 49 EC (prohibition of any measure rendering more difficult the provision of services 
between Member States) with the territorial scope of the Regulation (covering traffic between 
Member States and third countries) with the effect of applying Article 49 to a situation where 
no trade between Member States was at stake. 
                                                          
4 Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments, [1995] ECR I-1141, annotated by Hatzopoulos in CML Rev. (1995), 1427-
1445. 
5 Coppenhole and Devroe, (1995) JTDC, 13; also Devroe and Wouters, (1996) JTDC, 60. See however our 
annotation in this Review for a refutation of the critical position expressed by these authors. 
6 Case C-60/00, Carpenter, [2002] ECR I-6279. 
7 Case C-36/02, Omega, [2004] ECR I-9609. See also the annotation by Ackermann, CML Rev. (2005), 1107-1120. 
8 Omega rec. 21, emphasis added. 
9 Council Regulation (EEC) No 4055/86 of 22 December 1986, applying the principle of freedom to provide services 
to maritime transport between Member States and between Member States and third countries, (1986) OJ L 378, 
p. 1. 
10 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2408/92 of 23 July 1992 on access for Community air carriers to intra-Community air 
routes, (1992) OJ  L 15, p.33. 
11 For Regulation 4055/86 on maritime services, see Case C-381/93 Commission v. France, transport services [1994] 
ECR I-5145; for Regulation 2408/92 on air-transport, see Case C-70/99, Commission v. Portugal, Airport Taxes, 
[2001] ECR I-4845.  
12 Case 295/00, Commission v. Italy, Embarkation Tax, [2002] ECR I-1737. 
13 Case C-430/99, Sea-Land, [2002] ECR I-5235. 
14 The same conclusion had already been reached in Commission v. France, [1994] ECR I-5145. 
15 Case C-435/00, Geha Naftiliaki, [2002] ECR I-10615. 
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Similarly, the Court has condemned discriminatory national taxes on air transport, on the 
basis of both the sector specific secondary legislation and of Article 49.16 
 
 Procurement – concession contracts 
 
More striking is the case-law of the Court concerning public procurement. In this field we can 
distinguish two parallel trends. First, the Court simultaneously applies Article 49 EC and the 
sector specific Directives in order to complete possible lacunae contained in the latter. This 
tendency is illustrated by reference to case Commission v. France, Nord Pas de Calais,17 
where the Court held that, on top of the technical rules contained in the Works Directive 
93/37/EC, a general requirement of non-discrimination also applied. This judgment paved the 
way for the second and most important trend in the Court’s case-law, namely the application 
of Article 49 EC (and the public procurement Directives) to concession contracts, which are 
not covered by any text of secondary legislation. In a series of judgments starting with 
Telaustria,18 a case concerning a concession in the field of telecommunications, the Court 
held that the principle of non-discrimination also applies to concession contracts (and 
presumably any other type of contract which involves public funding and is not covered by the 
Procurement Directives). Coname19 concerned the direct award, in Italy, of a contract for the 
service covering the maintenance, operation and monitoring of the methane gas network. In 
its judgment the Court further explained that the above requirement of non-discrimination 
carries with it a further requirement of transparency, satisfied by adequate publicity. This trend 
was further pursued some months later in Parking Brixen,20 another Italian case concerning 
the construction and management of a public swimming-pool. The Court found that ‘a 
complete lack of any call for competition in the case of the award of a public service 
concession does not comply with the requirements of Articles 43 EC and 49 EC any more 
than with the principles of equal treatment, non-discrimination and transparency’.21 The same 
was confirmed some days later in Contse,22 concerning the award of a contract for the supply 
of home oxygen equipment in Spain. 
 
 Health and social security  
 
Even more important than the application of Article 49 EC to transport, public procurement 
and concession contracts is the extension of the scope of that same provision to embrace 
social security and health services.  
 
Social Security 
 
In Duphar23 in the field of goods, Poucet and Pistre24 in the field of services and constantly 
thereafter, the Court has held that ‘Community law does not detract from the powers of the 
Member States to organize their social security systems’. However, the Court has 
subsequently qualified this general statement. In a series of judgments concerning the 
applicability of the competition rules, the Court has gradually drawn a dividing line between 
funds (and other entities involved in social security and health care) which operate within the 
market and those which are outside (the market) and are governed by solidarity. The former 
should fully abide by all the competition rules, subject to Article 86(2), while the latter are 
exempted altogether from the application of the said rules.25 There is no hard and fast rule for 
                                                          
16 Case C-70/99, Commission v. Portugal, Airport Taxes, [2001] ECR I-4845; Case C-447/99, Commission v. Italy, Air 
Departure Tax, [2001] ECR I-5203; Case C-92/01, Stylianakis, [2003] ECR I-1291. 
17 Case C-225/98, Commission v. France, Nord Pas de Calais, [2000] ECR I-7445. 
18 Case C-324/98 Telaustria [2000] ECR I-745. 
19 Case C-231/03, Coname, [2005] ECR I-7287. 
20 Case C-458/03, Parking Brixen, [2005] ECR I-8612. 
21 Id. para 48. 
22 Case 234/03, Contse, [2005] ECR I-9315. 
23 Case 238/82, Duphar and Others v. Netherlands State, [1984] ECR 523, para 16. 
24 Joined Cases C-159/91 and C-160/91, Poucet and Pistre, [1993] ECR I-637, para 6. 
25 See Case C-238/94, FFSA, [1995] ECR I-4013; Case C-70/905, Sodemare, [1997] ECR I-3395; Case C-67/96, 
Albany, [1999] ECR I-5751; Joint Cases C-155/97 and C-157/97, Brentjens, [1999] ECR I-6025; and Case C-
219/97, Drijvende, [1999] ECR I-6121, respectively. On these three cases, see Idot, “Droit Social et droit de la 
concurrence: confrontation ou cohabitation (A propos de quelques développements récents)”, (1999) Europe, 
chron. 11; Case C-218/00, Batistello, [2002] ECR I-691; Case T-319/99, FENIN v. Commission, [2003] ECR II-357; 
Joined Cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01 and C-355/01, AOK Bundesverband, [2004] I-2493. 
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the above distinction, rather the Court refers to a set of criteria. Elements which would point to 
a non-market entity, include: a) the social objective pursued, b) the compulsory nature of the 
scheme, c) contributions paid being related to the income of the insured person, not to the 
nature of the risk covered, d) benefits accruing to insured persons not being directly linked to 
contributions paid by them, e) benefits and contributions being determined under the control 
or the supervision of the state, f) strong overall state control, g) the fact that funds collected 
are not capitalized and/or invested, but merely redistributed among participants in the 
scheme, i) cross-subsidization between different schemes and j) the nonexistence of 
competitive schemes offered by private operators.26 
It would be reasonable to assume that the same criteria also help determine the scope of 
application of Article 49 EC. Indeed, this was confirmed, in Freskot,27 concerning a public 
body set up by the Greek legislation for the prevention of, and compensation for, damage 
caused to agricultural holdings by natural disasters. Therefore, it should come as no surprise 
that in recent cases concerning the taxation of contributions paid to, and the benefits received 
from, insurance funds established in other Member States, the Court engaged into a fully 
fledged application of Article 49 EC. Danner28 and Skandia29 concerned tax arrangements 
regarding a voluntary (third pillar) and an occupational (second pillar) pension schemes, 
respectively. It remains that first pillar compulsory pension schemes do not qualify as services 
under the Treaty.30 
 
Health 
 
Even more spectacular has been the development of the Court’s case law in relation to health 
services. The importance of the relevant judgments may be appreciated by the fact that all the 
(old) Member States have occasionally intervened in the proceedings before the Court in this 
field, essentially with positions opposed to the ones finally adopted by the Court. This case 
law, lengthy, highly technical and politically controversial, has been presented in detail by 
several authors and does not find its place here.31 It is reminded, however, that a patient from 
any Member State moving abroad, may, next to urgent treatment provided by virtue of the 
European Insurance Card (ex document E 111):  
a) receive outpatient treatment32 in any other Member State and obtain refund from their 
home State, at the tariffs applicable in this latter State; no prior authorisation is necessary for 
such a refund to be obtained, since the relevant right stems directly from Article 49 EC; 
b) receive any kind of treatment in other Member States in the same conditions (tariffs, 
refund, indemnity etc – but for the duration) as patients of the host State, provided they have 
obtained prior authorisation (document E 112) by their home institution, according to Article 
22 of Regulation 1408/71; 
c) force the delivery of the above authorisation (for receiving treatment abroad) whenever the 
treatment objectively necessary for their medical condition 33 is not available in their home 
State or is not available within a reasonable waiting time, taking into consideration the specific 
needs of each particular patient;34 this is also a right directly stemming from Article 49 EC. 
                                                          
26 For a more detailed analysis of those criteria, see Hatzopoulos, ‘Health law and policy the impact of the EU’ in De 
Burca (Ed.), EU Law and the Welfare State: In Search of Solidarity, EUI/OUP (2005), pp. 123-160. 
27 Case C-355/00, Freskot v. Elliniko Dimosio, [2003] ECR I-5263. 
28 Case C-136/00, Danner, [2002] ECR I-8147. 
29 Case C-422/01, Skandia, [2003] ECR I-6817. Further for this case see 2.2.2. below. A similar factual situation was 
present in the earlier case C-302/98, Sehrer, [2000] ECR I-4585, concerning sickness insurance contributions, but 
it was dealt with under the rules on establishment. 
30 See Freskot. n. 27 above, Duphar and Poucet & Pistre cited above.  
31 See V. Hatzopoulos, ‘Killing national health and insurance systems but healing patients? The European market for 
health care services after the judgments of the ECJ in Vanbraekel and Peerbooms’, CML Rev. (2002), 683-729, 
and more recently ‘Health law and policy, the impact of the EU’, n. 26 above. See also G. Davies, ‘Welfare as a 
service’, (2002) LIEI 27-40; P. Cabral, ‘The Internal Market and the right to cross-border medical care’, (2004) 
ELRev, 673-685, and A.-P. van der Mei, ‘Cross-border access to health care within the EU: Some reflections on 
Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms and Vanbraekel’, (2002) ML, 289-215 and ‘Cross-border access to medical care: 
Non-hospital care and waiting lists’, (2004) LIEI, 57-67. More recently see A. Dawes, ‘Bonjour Herr Doctor: national 
healthcare systems, the Internal Market and cross-border medical care within the EU’, (2006) LIEI, 167-182. For a 
full account of the relationships between EU and Health Law see T. Hervey and J. McHale, Health Law and the 
European Union, CUP (Cambridge, 2004). 
32 Inpatient treatment has been restrictively defined, see Case C-8/02 Leichtle [2004] ECR I- 2641.  
33 For the objective assesment of the necessity of the treatment, independently from national preferences, see Case 
C-368/98, Vanbraekel, [2001] ECR I-5363.  
34Case C-385/99, Müller-Fauré, [2003] ECR I-4509 and Case C-372/04, Watts [2006] ECR I-4325. 
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These rights benefit all people insured with the competent institution of one member state, 
irrespectively of whether the home State35 a) operates a refund system, like the one followed 
(principally) in France, Germany and Luxembourg,36 b) operates a benefits-in-kind system by 
contracted in physicians and hospitals, as is the case in the Netherlands,37 or c) offers 
benefits-in-kind by essentially public institutions, as it is the case in the UK and Italy38.  
 
1.1.1.3. Application of the Treaty rules when there is no extraterritorial element 
 
General case law 
 
The general rule according to which the Treaty provisions on free movement only apply to 
interstate situations has been under fire for over ten years now.39 In the field of goods, the 
judgments in cases Lancry and Simitzi v. Kos,40 Pistre and Guimont41 stand for the idea that 
‘Article [28] cannot be considered inapplicable simply because all the facts of the specific 
case before the national Court are confined to a single Member State’.42 This same idea was 
transposed in Reisch,43 a case concerning the free movement of capitals. Finally, in relation 
to workers, the Court, indirectly in Surinder Singh44 and then, in a more direct way in 
Angonese,45 has been ready to apply Articles 43 and 39 EC, respectively, to situations which 
only remotely presented some trans-national element.  
However, it is in the field of free movement of services, with its judgment in Carpenter, that 
the Court took the boldest step away from the need to establish a trans-border element as a 
precondition to the application of the Treaty rules. The Court focused on the fact that Mr. 
Carpenter’s activity consisted in the provision of advertising services and that some of these 
services were offered to recipients in other Member States. Thus, the Court identified the two 
elements upon which the application of Article 49 EC lies, that is a) some service activity b) 
provided temporarily over borders.  However, the Court avoided examining whether the two 
elements merged, in other words, whether any specific trans-border service provision was at 
stake and how this was affected by the contested measure – if at all. Consequently, Article 49 
EC was found to apply.  
 
 Extra-territorial by nature? 
 
Further to the Court’s broad approach to the existence of some trans-national element 
illustrated in Carpenter, some recent judgments seem to suggest that certain categories of 
services are by definition trans-national. Hence, the Court applies Article 49 EC without ever 
identify any specific trans-border service movement. 
The first category of services in which this seems to hold true is transport. In all the cases 
discussed above (1.1.1.2), the Court took for granted that Article 49 EC applied, and only at a 
subsequent stage did it examine whether in fact services to and from other Member States 
were more severely affected. Therefore, the existence of some trans-border element did not 
constitute a prerequisite to the application of Article 49 EC, but one of the appreciations 
inherent in its application. 
                                                          
35 The threefold classification which follows is simplistic, for the needs of demonstration, and does not account for the 
special characteristics of each one of the national systems. 
36 See Case C-158/96, Kohll, [1998] ECR Ι-1931; Case C-56/01, Inizan, [2003] ECR I-12403; Case C-193/03, Bosch, 
[2004] ECR I-9911. 
37 Case C-157/99, Smits & Peerbooms, [2001] ECR I-5473; Vanbraekel and Müller-Fauré, all cited above. 
38 Watts, above. 
39 See amongst others: D. Simon and F. Lagondet, ‘Libre circulation des marchandises et situations purement 
internes: chronique d’une mort annoncée’, (1997) Europe chron. 9; Tagaras, ‘Règles communautaires de libre 
circulation, discriminations à rebours et situations dites « purement internes »’ in Mélanges en hommage à Michel 
Waelbroeck, vol II (Bruylant 1999), 1499; R. Papadopoulou, ‘Situations purement internes et droit communautaire: 
un instrument jurisprudentiel à double fonction ou une arme à double tranchant ?’, (2001) CDE, 96-129 ; Shuibhne, 
‘Free movement of persons and the wholly internal rule: time to move on?’, CML Rev. (2002), 731. 
40 Case C-363/93, Lancry, [1994] ECR I-3957 and Joined Cases C-485/93 and C-486/93, Simitzi v. Kos, [1995] ECR 
I-2665. 
41 Case C-448/98, Guimont, [2000] ECR I-10663. 
42 Pistre, n. 24 above. 
43 Joined Cases C-515/99, C-519/99 to C-524/99 and C-526/99 to C-540/99, Reisch e.a. v. Salzburg, [2002] ECR I-
2157; compare paras 24-27 of this judgment with paras 21-24 of Guimont. See also Case C-300/01, Salzmann, 
[2003] ECR I-4899. 
44 Case C-370/90, Surinder Singh, [1992] ECR I-4265. 
45 Case C-281/98, Agnonese, [2000] ECR I-4139. 
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A second category of services in which the Court applies Article 49 EC without insisting upon 
the existence of some trans-border element are advertising services. This may be illustrated 
by reference to the very judgment in Carpenter. 46 In a more explicit way, in Gourmet47, a case 
in which a Swedish undertaking was opposing the total ban imposed by Swedish law on the 
advertising of alcoholic beverages, the Court held that ‘even if [the prohibition] is non-
discriminatory, [it] has a particular effect on the cross-border supply of advertising space, 
given the international nature of the advertising market in the category of products to which 
the prohibition relates, and thereby constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide services 
within the meaning of Article 59 [now 49]’.48 
The third category of services deemed to be transnational are TV broadcasting and 
telecommunications services. Hence, in De Coster,49 which concerned a municipal tax 
imposed on parabolic antennae, the Court dealt dismissively with the lack of extra-
territoriality, simply recalling that ‘it is settled case-law that the transmission, and 
broadcasting, of television signals comes within the rules of the Treaty relating to the 
provision of services’. In Mobistar,50 which concerned a municipal tax imposed on GSM 
retransmission pylons, the Court took for granted that Article 49 EC applied to 
telecommunications services, but then found no violation of the aforementioned provision as 
there was no affectation of trans-border services.51 This is yet another striking example of the 
Court ‘internalizing’ the existence of a trans-frontier element: it is no longer used as a 
precondition to the applicability of the free movement of services rules, but rather, as an 
appreciation ‘internal’ to the said rules, leading the Court’s assessment as to the existence of 
a violation.52  
 
 No need for extraterritoriality when EU legislation in the field? 
 
It has been shown above that the Court applies the Treaty rules together with, or instead of, 
the public procurement Directives.53 Long before that, the Court had already decided that the 
procurement directives apply to wholly internal situations.54 Henceforth, after the judgments in 
Coname and Parking Brixen, it is clear that in the field of public procurement and/or 
concession contracts, Article 49 EC shall apply without there being a need to establish a 
trans-border element. The reason given for this is that the detailed secondary legislation in 
this field is not merely aimed at the abolition of all discriminations based on nationality, but 
also – and essentially – at the creation of a level playing field for all European companies to 
compete unfettered by national regulatory regimes.55 The fact that principles enshrined in 
secondary legislation apply irrespective of the presence of a trans-national element has been 
clearly confirmed, more recently, in relation to the Data Protection Directive,56 in 
Österreichischer Rundfunk.57 This finding could lead to a greater number of services being 
governed by Article 49 EC without any transnational element being necessary; in any case, it 
could offer a plausible explanation for some of the judgments presented above.58 In fact, all 
transport, telecommunications and TV broadcasting, and to a lesser extent advertising, have 
been regulated at EU level by secondary legislation texts. 
 
1.1.2. Remuneration 
 
                                                          
46 Carpenter, n. 6 above, para 29. It is true that in Case C-134/03, Viacom Outdoor, [2005] ECR I-1167, concerning a 
municipal tax imposed on billboard advertising, the Court declined the application of Art. 49, but that was more 
because of the lack of any substantially restrictive effect the contested measure, rather than because of the lack of 
any trans-border element. 
47 Case C-405/98, Gourmet, [2001] ECR I-1795. 
48 Ibid., para 39, emphasis added. 
49 See also the note by Wenneras, ‘The De Coster Case: Reflections on Tax and Proportionality’, (2002) LIEI, 219-
230. 
50 Joined Cases C-544/03 and 545/03, Mobistar & Belgacom, judgment of 8 September 2005, nyr. 
51 Id., paras 32 and 33. 
52 This seems to constitute a shift from previous case-law, in particular Case C-108/96, Mac Quen, [2001] ECR I-837.  
53 See 1.1.1.2 above. 
54 Case C-243/89, Commission v. Danemark, Storbaelt, [1993] ECR I-3353. 
55 Ibid. para 33. 
56 Directive 95/46/EC of the Council of 24 October 1995 (1995) OJ L281/31. 
57 Joined Cases C-465/00, C-138/01 and C-139/01, Österreichischer Rundfunk, [2003] ECR I-4989, para 42. See 
also Keppenne and Van Raepenbusch, ‘Les principaux développements de la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice 
et du Tribunal de Première Instance, Année 2003’,  (2004) CDE, 439-513, who also make out this point. 
58 See 1.1.1.3.2 above. 
 8
The existence of remuneration is, according to Article 50 EC, the feature which gives any 
activity its economic nature, thus bringing it within the scope of the Treaty freedoms. 
According to the Court ‘the essential characteristic of remuneration lies in the fact that it 
constitutes consideration for the service in question and is normally agreed upon between the 
provider and the recipient of the service’.59 This definition, however, has been considerably 
widened in recent cases. In Deliège the Court accepted that non-professional athletes could 
nonetheless receive remuneration for their ‘services’ in an indirect way, through TV 
broadcasting, sponsorships, participation in publicity campaigns etc. In the healthcare cases 
discussed above (1.1.1.2), the Court accepted that ‘the payments made by the sickness 
insurance funds [for treatment delivered to insured patients], albeit set at a flat rate, are 
indeed the consideration for the hospital services and unquestionably represent remuneration 
for the hospital which receives them’.60  Thus, consideration was found to exist not only in 
triangular situations,61 but, more importantly, in situations where the correlation between 
services received and moneys paid is only indirect if economically nonexistent. Further, in 
Danner and Skandia62 the Court accepted that remuneration can be paid well in advance for a 
service which is to be delivered over 30 years later, i.e. the payment of an old-age pension. 
The above judgments leave us with a concept of remuneration which is extremely flexible, if 
not ever expandable – a serious challenge for legal certainty.  
 
1.1.3. Abandoning the ‘subsidiary’ character of the rules on services in relation to the 
other fundamental freedoms  
 
According to the black letter of Articles 49 and 50 EC, the rules on services are supposed to 
apply to situations where no other Treaty freedom applies; they have a subordinate character. 
In this respect, services (Article 49) were traditionally distinguished from establishment 
(Article 43) by virtue of their temporary nature. Hence, in the German insurance case,63 the 
Court held that as soon as the service provider acquired some stable infrastructure in the host 
State, the Treaty provisions on establishment became applicable. This position was later 
reviewed in Gebhard,64 where the Court recognized that a provider of services within the 
meaning of Article 49 EC could make use of some permanent infrastructure in the host State. 
Nevertheless, the Court insisted on the temporal character of the provision of services. It 
stated that ‘not only the duration of the provision of the service, but also its regularity, 
periodicity or continuity’65 may bring it under the rules on establishment. This made 
commentators conclude that service provision must be of an ‘episodic’ or ‘irregular’ nature.66  
In its most recent case low, however, the Court seems to be abandoning the temporal 
criterion in favour of a more economic one. Indeed, the Court seems ready to treat economic 
activities which qualify as services under Article 49 EC, irrespective of their duration. Hence, 
in Schnitzer67 the Court held that a Portuguese construction company which had been on a 
construction site in Germany for over three years could, nevertheless, invoke the rules on 
services, in order to evade the full application of the German legislation. The Court 
acknowledged that the nature of the activity is readily ascertainable and can safely lead to 
legal qualifications, while its duration, periodicity, etc., are not. 68 
Some months later, the Court judged of the compatibility with Article 49 EC of a Portuguese 
law which concerned undertakings offering private security services. The fact that this piece 
of legislation only applied to undertakings operating on the Portuguese territory for periods 
exceeding a calendar year, had no incidence.69   
                                                          
59 Case 263/86, Belgian State v. Humbel, [1988] ECR 5365, para 17. 
60 Smits & Peerbooms, n. 37 above, para 58, emphasis added. 
61 Which has already been accepted since Case 352/85, Bond van Adverteerders and Others, [1988] ECR 2085, 
para 16. 
62 Both cited above n. 28 and 29. 
63 Case 205/84, Commission v. Germany, Insurance, [1986] ECR 3755. 
64 Case C-55/94, Gebhard, [1995] ECR I-4165. 
65 Gebhard para 21. 
66 See V. Hatzopoulos, Recent developments of the case law of the ECJ in the field of free of services 1994-1999”, 
CML Rev. (2000), p. 43-82, 45, where this restrictive approach of the Court was also criticized as being 
inappropriate in view of the current development and sophistication of services. 
67 Case C-215/01, Schnitzer, [2003] ECR I-14847. 
68 Schnitzer, para 39. 
69 Case C-171/02, Commission v. Portugal, Private Security Firms, [2004] I-5645.  
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These judgments further confirm and justify earlier cases a) where the long duration of an 
activity had not precluded the application of the rules on services70 and b) concerning 
‘naturally’ trans-border services,71 such as TV broadcasting, telecommunications or 
transport,72 where the Court applied Article 49 EC without taking into account any temporal 
consideration.  
Not only does this recent case law make clear that it is the economic nature – and not the 
duration – of the activity that constitutes the main criterion for its legal classification, but also, 
it creates a presumption in favour of the application of Article 49 EC in all service situations. 
At the same time, it does away, once and for all, with the myth of services being a subsidiary 
category.  
 
1.1.4. Outer limits: non-economic services (of general interest)  
 
The rules on services apply to a great many activities, but leave intact services of general 
interest with no economic character. From an economic viewpoint, services with no economic 
character are those from which it makes no sense to exclude ‘free-riders’, who are not ready 
to pay for them. More precisely, three conditions should be met for a service linked to the 
general interest to qualify as non economic: a) an objective necessity for such a service to be 
provided, b) important fixed but nearly non-existent variable costs, linked to the number of 
beneficiaries and c) (some) people unwilling to pay for such a service, if they had to. Hence, 
services like police, the army, garbage collection, funeral services do not, in principle, fall 
within the ambit of Article 49 EC. Such services may be classified into two broad categories: 
a) ‘social’ services which are essentially unmarketable, precisely because they do not 
embody market values and b) ‘strategic’ services which the State would hardly trust any other 
entity to pursue.73 In the former category the Court has held i.a. that the organization of 
primary pension schemes,74 the setting up of a mandatory indemnity system for farmers, 75 
the running of old-age houses,76 all fall outside the scope of Article 49 EC. In the latter 
category, the Court has held i.a. the coordination of air-traffic control,77 the operation of a 
body entrusted with preventive anti-pollution surveillance78 and the organization of communal 
funeral services79 not to come within the Treaty rules.  
However, despite their social character, complementary and voluntary (second and third 
pillar) pension schemes come within the Treaty rules,80 just like healthcare services.81 
Likewise, public security and public order, are not fields exclusively reserved to the State 
police, but may be partly secured by market forces, i.e. private security companies.82 The 
distinction between services which do and those which do not have an economic nature is not 
an easy one to draw, at the first place, as it depends on basic political and social choices 
concerning the role of the State. It is dynamic too, depending both on the way the State 
accomplishes its missions and on market forces and private entrepreneurship. One thing is 
beyond doubt, however: whenever remuneration may be shown to exist for any given service, 
this service will be treated as having a commercial nature. Therefore, the extremely flexible 
and ever expanding concept of remuneration used by the Court,83 may only lead to the 
correlative restriction of the number and scope of services excluded from the Treaty rules. 
 
1.2. A set of rules (violation/exceptions) closely comparable with that on the other 
freedoms: 
 
                                                          
70 See e.g. Joined Cases C-369/96 and C-376/96, Arblade and Leloup, [1999] ECR I-8453. 
71 For which see 1.1.1.3, above. 
72 Case C-17/00, De Coster, [2001] ECR I-9445; Joined Cases C-544/03 and C-545/03, Mobistar and Belgacom, 
judgment of 8 September 2005, nyr.; and Case C-92/01, Stylianakis, [2003] ECR I-1291, respectively. 
73 See C. Scott, ‘Services of General Interest in EC Law: Matching Values to Regulatory Technique in the Public and 
Private Sectors’ (2000) ELJ 310-325, 313. 
74 Joined Cases C-159 & 160/91 Poucet & Pistre [1993] ECR I-637. 
75 Case C-355/00 Freskot v. Elliniko Dimosio [2003] ECR I-5263. 
76 Case C-70/95 Sodemare [1997] ECR I-3395. In the meantime some uncertainty had been created by the judgment 
of the Court in Case C-238/94 FFSA [1995] ECR I-4013. 
77 Case C-364/92 Eurocontrol [1994] ECR I-43. 
78 Case C-343/95 Cali e Figli [1997] ECR I-1547. 
79 Case 30/87 Bodson [1988] ECR 2479. 
80 See Danner and Skandia, above n. 28 and 29. 
81 See above 1.1.1.2. 
82 See above n. 69. 
83 Discussed above at 1.1.2. 
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Concerning the material scope of Αrticle 49 EC, three remarks need to be made. First, 
concerning the way the rules on services are held to be violated (1.2.1); second, concerning 
justifications to such violations (1.2.2); and, third, concerning the provision of services of 
general interest (1.2.3).  
 
1.2.1. Violation of Article 49 EC 
 
The case law of the Court in the field of services during these last years has increased 
exponentially.84 The substantive analysis of the relevant judgments does not find its place 
here. If we were to sum up the bulk of the Court’s case law, the concept of convergence 
between the fundamental Treaty freedoms would emerge. 85 This general statement should, 
nevertheless, be qualified by two further remarks. 
First, the Court has consistently refused to transpose on services the Keck dichotomy, 
between selling arrangements, on the one hand, and product characteristics, on the other.86 
Nevertheless, second, after a period of seemingly limitless expansion of the material ambit of 
Article 49 EC,87 the Court in its recent case law has introduced some kind of a ‘rule of law’ to 
its application. The most striking illustration is offered by the judgment of the Court in 
Mobistar,88 where the Court after repeating the mantra that every measure ‘which is liable to 
prohibit or further impede the activities of a provider of services established in another 
Member State’ is contrary to Article 49 EC, made the following remarkable statement: 
‘measures, the only effect of which is to create additional costs in respect of the service in 
question and which affect in the same way the provision of services between Member States 
and that within one Member State, do not fall within the scope of Article 59 [now 49] of the 
Treaty.’89 In this way it introduced in the field of services, a dichotomy between 
expenses/other hindrances whereby the scope of Article 49 EC is to be limited. It is submitted 
that this distinction is the transformation of the Keck dichotomy in the field of services and, 
indeed, the real rationale of the Keck dichotomy itself. 90 The practical result is that Member 
States are free to maintain regulations of a purely economic nature, to the extent that they are 
non-discriminatory, but are under strict scrutiny concerning the administrative and other 
requirements imposed on service providers. 
 
1.2.2. Justifications to restrictions 
 
Convergence is also the first word to describe the case law of the Court concerning 
justifications admitted to restrictions of Article 49 EC. Convergence, in this respect is to be 
observed at two levels. First, between the various fundamental freedoms.91 Second, and 
                                                          
84 The ECJ has gone from deciding 40 cases in the five year period between 1995-1999 to deciding over 140 cases 
based on Art 49 EC between 2000-2005; see V. Hatzopoulos and U. Do, ‘The Case Law of the ECJ Concerning 
the Free Provision of Services: 2000-2005’ (2006) CMLRev 923-991. 
85 For the ‘bringing together’ of the four freedoms see, among many: P. Oliver and W. Roth, ‘The internal market and 
the four freedoms’ CML Rev. (2004), 407-441, 430 et seq., and V. Hatzopoulos, ‘Trente ans après les arrêts 
fondamentaux de 1974, les quatre libertés: quatre?’ in Demaret, Govaere, Hanf (Eds.), 30 Years of European 
Legal Studies at the College of Europe - 30 ans d'études juridiques européennes au Collège d'Europe: Liber 
Professorum 1973/74-2003/04, P.I.E.-Peter Lang (Bruxelles, 2005), pp. 185-201. See also Caputi Jambrenghi, & 
Pullen, ‘The use of Articles 30 and 52 to attack barriers to market access: an overview of the ECJ’s case law’, 
(1996) ECLR, 388; Bernard, ‘La libre circulation des marchandises, des personnes et des services dans le traité 
CE sous l’angle de la compétence’, (1998) CDE, 11-45; Oliver, ‘Goods and services: two freedoms compared’, in 
Mélanges en hommage à Michel Waelboreck, vol II (Bruylant 1999), pp. 1377-1405; O’Leary, ‘The free movement 
of persons and services’ in Craig and de Bùrca, The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford 1999), pp. 377-416; see also in 
Andenas and Roth (Eds.), Services and Free Movement in EU Law (Oxford 2001) the extremely interesting 
contributions by Poiares Maduro, pp. 41-68, Snell and Andenas, pp. 69-140, Jarass, pp. 141-163, and Hansen, pp. 
197-210. 
86 See, among many cases, Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments, [1995] ECR I-1141, annotated by V. Hatzopoulos in 
CML Rev. (1995), 1427-1445; and Case C-405/98, Gourmet, [2001] ECR I-1795 and among the many 
commentators, A. Biondi, ‘Advertising alcohol and the free movement principle: the Gourmet decision’, (2001) 
ELRev, 616-622; Kaczorowska, ‘Gourmet can have his Keck and eat it!’, (2004) ELJ, 479-494; and J. Stuyck, 
‘Gourmet: une nouvelle brèche dans la jurisprudence « Keck »?’, (2001) CDE, 683-706. 
87 See e.g. Case C-17/00, De Coster, [2001] ECR I-9445 and Wenneras, “The De Coster Case: Reflections on Tax 
and Proportionality”, (2002) LIEI, 219-230. 
88 Joined Cases C-544/03 and C-545/03, Mobistar and Belgacom, judgment of 8 September 2005, nyr. 
89 Mobitel, para 31. 
90 For a brief comment of this distinction see our comment on Alpine Investments in (1995) CMLRev 1427-1445. 
91 See already V. Hatzopoulos, n. 66 above, p. 72. See also Hatzopoulos, ‘Exigences essentielles, impératives ou 
impérieuses: une théorie, des théories ou pas de théorie du tout?’, (1998) RTDE 2, 191-236; O'Leary and 
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more interestingly for the purposes of the present study, convergence is also increasingly 
observed between express and judge-made justifications. Hence in Gambelli the Court 
indistinctively ‘considered whether such restrictions are acceptable as exceptional measures 
expressly provided for in Articles 45 and 46 EC, or justified, in accordance with the case-law 
of the Court, for reasons of overriding general interest’; it answered this question based only 
on a classical ‘mandatory requirements’ analysis.92 More strikingly still, in Commission v 
France, Loi Evin the Court openly held that ‘the freedom to provide services may […] be 
limited by national rules justified by the reasons mentioned in Article 56(1) of the EC Treaty, 
read together with Article 66, or for overriding requirements of the general interest’.93 The 
second main characteristic of the Court’s case law on justifications, is the use of a stringent 
necessity/ proportionality test of the contested national measures. Examples may be drawn 
i.a. from the judgments in Gambelli94 and Placanica, in the field gambling.95 The Court 
recognised that the protection of consumers and other reasons of general interest could 
justify restrictions to betting ativities. However, such restrictions would only be admissible if 
the invoked objectives are pursued by the State in ‘a consistent and systematic manner’; this 
cannot hold true where the Member State in question also adopts/maintains measures which 
favour gambling. A similar logic prevailed in Finalarte, concerning posted workers. The Court 
found that the host Member State could extend its restrictive legislation to posted workers, 
provided that ‘those rules confer a genuine benefit on the workers concerned, which 
significantly adds to their social protection’.96 The national Court was left to verify whether this 
condition was met, according to the grid of analysis provided by the Luxembourg Court 
itself.97 
 
1.2.3. Respect for public service: financial setup is free but not extra administrative 
burdens 
 
In the cases in which the free movement of services could be held to enter directly into 
conflict with the provision of some service of general economic interest, the Court gave clear 
prevalence to the latter over the former. In the early Corbeau and Almelo judgments the Court 
had developed the concept of ‘severability’, whereby profitable activities should remain 
subject to the Treaty rules, while non-profitable ones would evade them.98 In the most recent 
case law, however, this idea is being severely limited, if not altogether abandoned. In 
Deutsche Post the Court was really fast in admitting that Article 86(2) EC could justify 
exceptions to the Treaty rules, to the extent that such exceptions were indispensable for the 
pursuit of activities of general economic interest.99 More importantly, in Glöckner100 which 
concerned emergency and other ambulance services, the Court held the two to be 
inseparable and altogether outside the scope of the competition rules: monies generated by 
the latter services could enable the operators concerned to discharge their general-interest 
task in conditions of ‘economic equilibrium’. For one thing, the test of ‘economic equilibrium’ is 
different from the previous logic of ‘severability’, based on the criterion of mere viability of 
services of general interest. Moreover, the readiness with which the Court accepted in 
Deutsche Post that the fees charged by the monopolist were necessary for the discharge of 
its general interest obligations, without examining in any detail the accuracy of such a 
statement, takes Glöckner a step further, as it shows the Court’s increasingly hands-off 
approach towards the financing of activities of general interest. Further, the Court has 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Fernandez-Martin, ‘Judicially created exceptions to the free provision of services’, Andenas and Roth (Eds.), n. 148 
above, pp. 163-196. 
92 Case C-243/01, Gambelli, [2003] ECR I-13031, para 60, emphasis added. 
93 Case C-262/02, Commission v. France, Loi Evin, [2004] ECR I-6569, para 23. 
94 Cited above n. 92. 
95 Joined Cases C-338/04, 359/04 et 360/04, Placanica, judgment of March 6, 2007, nyr. 
96 Joined Cases C-49/98, C-50/98, C-52/98 to C-54/98 and C-68/98 to C-71/98, Finalarte, [2001] ECR I-7831, para 
42. 
97 More on this case and in general on the topic of posted workers see below, at 2.2.2.3. 
98 Case C-320/91, Corbeau, [1993] ECR I-2562 and Case C-393/92, Almelo, [1994] ECR I-1477. See for these 
judgments Wachsmann and Berrod, ‘Les critères de justification des monopoles: un premier bilan après l'affaire 
Corbeau’, (1994) RTDE, 39. See also Baquero Cruz, ‘Beyond competition: services of general economic interest 
and EC law’ in De Burca (Ed.), n. 26 above, pp. 169-212. 
99 Case C-147/97, Deutsche Post, [2000] ECR I-825. 
100 Case C-475/99, Glöckner, [2001] ECR I-8089. 
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undertaken to set the conditions under which public funds given to an entity entrusted with the 
provision of some service of general interest, do not qualify as state aids. 101 
However, if financing the services of general interest is increasingly left to the discretion of the 
States, the same is not true with other, administrative restrictions, such a prior authorisation 
requirement.102  
 
1.3. From mutual recognition to a near home country control  (HCC) principle  
 
Since the judgment in Säger the Court invariably holds that ‘a Member State may not make 
the provision of services in its territory subject to compliance with all the conditions required 
for establishment’.103 Moreover, the principle of mutual recognition has occupied an ever 
increasing role in the Court’s case law in relation to services. Through a series of judgments, 
the Court transforms this functional general principle of EC law,104 into two more specific but 
far-fetched principles, the furtherance of which should only be achieved through legislative 
means. First the Court pushes mutual recognition towards some kind of ‘home state’ control 
(1.3.1) which, in turn, creates the need for close cooperation between Member States’ 
authorities (1.3.2). 
 
1.3.1. Towards a general application of an imperfect home State control? 
 
On many occasions the legislation of Member States has been condemned for failing to take 
into account conditions fulfilled or guarantees offered by service providers in their home State. 
Hence, in Commission v. Italy, transport consultants 105 the Italian legislation required 
transport consultants, among other things, to have a security lodged with the provincial 
administration. This requirement was found to be illegal to the extent that it made it 
‘impossible for account to be taken of obligations to which the person providing the service is 
already subject in the Member State in which he is established’.106 The very same 
requirements were also struck down by the Court for exactly the same reasons in relation to 
the activities of temporary labour agencies operating in Italy, in Commission v. Italy, 
temporary labour agencies.107 
 Similarly, in Commission v Italy, sanitation services108 a registration requirement was held to 
violate Article 49 EC to the extent that it did ‘not exclude from its scope a provider of services 
who is established in a Member State other than the Italian Republic and who, under the 
legislation of its Member State of establishment, already satisfies formal requirements 
equivalent to those under the Italian Law’.109 Although this judgment predates the two 
mentioned above, it is more earth-shattering, insofar as it does not concern a mere financial 
guarantee, but the very authorization itself delivered by the host State authorities.  
In Commission v. The Netherlands, private security firms110 the Court held Article 49 EC to be 
breached both by a prior authorisation requirement and by a system of special ID cards for 
security personnel ‘in so far as it [did] not take account of the controls or verifications already 
                                                          
101 Case 280/00 Altmark Trans [2003] ECR I-7747 ; see also O. Dupéron ‘ Le régime des services publics en droit 
communautaire: des précisions apportées par la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes’, (2003) Petites 
affiches nº 229 p.6-12 ; J.-L. Clergérie, ‘La légalité d'une contrepartie d'obligation de service public’ (2003) Dalloz 
Jur. p. 2814-2817 ; M. Merola & C. Medina, ‘De l'arrêt Ferring à l'arrêt Altmark: continuité ou revirement dans 
l'approche du financement des services publics’ (2003) CDE, p. 639-694. On the basis of this judgment the 
Commission has issued the so called ‘Altmark Package’, also known as the ‘Monti-Kroes Package’, consisting of 
three texts: Directive 2005/81/EC modifying Directive 80/723/EEC on the transparency of financial relations 
between Member States and public undertakings OJ [2005] L 312/47; Decision 2005/842/EC, on the application of 
Article 86(2) of the EC Treaty to State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain 
undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest, OJ [2005] L 312/67; and the 
‘Community Framework for State aid in the form of public service compensation’ 2005/C OJ [2005] C 297/4. 
102 Case C-205/99, Analir, [2001] ECR I-1271. See Slot, CML Rev. (2003), 159-168. 
103 Above n. 2, para 13.  
104 See Hatzopoulos, Le principe communautaire d’équivalence et de reconnaissance mutuelle dans la libre 
prestation de services,  Sakkoulas/Bruylant (1999), pp. 73-100. For a different account see “Mutual Recognition” in 
Barnard and Scott (Eds.), The Law of the Single European Market, Unpacking the Premisses, Hart (Oxford, 2002), 
pp. 225-267. 
105 Case C-263/99, Commission v. Italy, Transport Consultants, [2001] ECR I-4195. 
106 Ibid, para 24. 
107 Case C-279/00, Commission v. Italy, Temporary Labour Agencies, [2002] ECR I-1425. 
108 Case C-358/98, Commission v. Italy, Sanitation Services, [2000] ECR I-1255. 
109 Ibid, para 13, emphasis added. 
110 Case C-189/03, Commission v. The Netherlands, Private Security Firms, [2004] ECR I-9289. 
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carried out in the Member State of origin’.111 The Court further held that the identity of the 
individuals concerned could be proven by the valid passport or ID card delivered by their 
home state authorities.112  
The above judgments stand, first, for the idea that all controls and checks carried out by the 
home State should be taken into account by the authorities of the host State, irrespective of 
whether they refer to purely formal guarantees, such as the deposit of some financial security, 
or to substantial qualifications, such as the competence and integrity of service providers. 
What is more, this obligation of the host State authorities covers not only checks that have 
been made by the home State in view of the exercise of the specific service activity, but also 
of those aimed at different purposes (such as the issuance of the passports in the Dutch 
case). Second, these judgments stand for the idea that the application of some variety of the 
home State principle comes as an integral component of the proportionality test of national 
measures. Hence, although the Court is not in a position to implement a fully fledged home 
State control whereby the host State authorities would be devoid of any competence over 
service providers from other Member States, it does nonetheless introduce such a principle 
through the back door, by way of the strengthened control of the proportionality of national 
measures. 
 
1.3.2. Duty of cooperation between national authorities 
 
A corollary to the above imperfect home State principle and a technical condition for its 
application is the duty of Member States’ authorities to cooperate with one another. Such 
cooperation may take two forms.  
First, it may require the authorities of the host state to fully take into account and/or make full 
use of all the information, documents, certification etc provided by the home state authorities’. 
The case law discussed above, concerning authorizations, notifications, the deposit of some 
form of guarantee or the issuance of duplicate (host) identification documents etc illustrates 
this.113 It constitutes a typical application of the principle of mutual recognition. 
Second, the duty to cooperate may demand that the authorities of the Member States 
concerned work actively together, in order to positively promote the pursuance of the Treaty 
fundamental freedoms. This is a much more delicate path to venture upon and the Court has 
displayed both caution and firmness. In a first series of cases the Court has built upon the 
specific cooperation obligations imposed by texts of secondary legislation. In IKA v 
Ioannidis,114 where the right of a Greek pensioner to claim a refund from his fund for 
treatment received in Germany under the terms of Regulation 1408/71 115 was at stake. The 
Court held that the authorities involved could not restrict themselves to a mechanic 
application of their obligations under Regulation 1408/71. Rather, they should ‘in accordance 
with Article 10 EC […] cooperate in order to ensure that those provisions are applied correctly 
[…] with a view to facilitating the freedom of movement of those insured persons are fully 
respected’.116 
In Kapper,117 a case where the German authorities were contesting the validity of a driving 
license delivered by the Dutch, the Court found a violation of Directive 92/439/EC118 and of 
Articles 39, 43 and 49 EC. Not only did the Court completely rule out the possibility that a 
license issued by the authorities of one member be invalidated by those of another Member 
                                                          
111 Ibid., para 30. 
112 This judgment is just one, albeit the most concise and clear, of a series of infringement cases concerning private 
security firms and decided by the Court upon quasi-identical facts: Case C-355/98, Commission v. Belgium, Private 
Security Firms, [2000] ECR I-1221; Case C-283/99, Commission v. Italy, [2001] ECR I-4363; Case C-165/98, 
Mazzoleni, [2001] ECR I-2189; Case C-171/02 Commission v. Portugal [2004] ECR I-5645.  
113 See 1.3.1 above. 
114 C-326/00, Ioannidis v. IKA, [2003] ECR I-1703, and for a thorough presentation of this case the comment by 
Hatzopoulos in CML Rev. (2003), 1251-1268. 
115 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to employed 
persons, to self-employed persons and to members of their families moving within the Community. This Regulation 
has been modified at least thirty times, the last important modification extending its personal scope to cover 
nationals of non Member States legally residing within the EU, see Council Regulation (EC) 859/2003 of 14 May 
2003, OJ L 124/1. It has recently been codified and repealed by Regulation (EC) 883/2004 of 29 April 2004, OJ L 
166/1. 
116 Ioannidis v. IKA, above, para 51, emphasis added. 
117 Case C-476/01, Kapper, [2004] ECR I-5205. 
118 Council Directive 91/439/EEC of 29 July 1991 on driving licenses (OJ 1991 L 237, p. 1), as amended by Council 
Directive 97/26/EC of 2 June 1997, OJ 1997 L 150, p. 41. 
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State, but it also recognized the possibility of initiating infringement proceedings against 
States, the authorities of which fail to cooperate effectively.  
A step further was taken in Danner,119 where the Court rejected the Danish governments’ 
argument that the effectiveness of fiscal controls justified that pensions paid to residents by 
foreign funds did not qualify for a deduction from taxable income. The Court held that even 
where the secondary legislation in place (Directive 77/799 120)  does not effectively meet the 
legitimate objectives pursued by the host State’s authorities, the latter are required to look into 
and to accept further evidence provided by the interested party, before imposing a restrictive 
measure.  
Such an obligation may also be imposed upon Member States’ authorities even in the 
absence of any specific text of secondary legislation. In Oulane the Court held that the 
requirement that all Member States’ nationals should posses a valid passport or ID card while 
in another Member State, could not be imposed in an absolute way, if the person concerned 
were able to provide unequivocal proof of their nationality by other means. This implies that 
the authorities in question may not rely only on the official documents they are familiar with, 
but may further be required to adduce evidence, concerning the person’s identity, by other 
means, probably in collaboration with the authorities of the Member State of origin of the 
person concerned.  
Through these cases it may be said that the Court, within the material limits of its capacity as 
an actor of negative integration, is, in some indirect and imperfect way, trying to foster positive 
cooperation obligations between Member States’ authorities. This does not (and may not) go 
as far as a proper ‘home state control’, since the home State authorities maintain the last 
word on the operation of foreign service providers in their territory. It would be technically 
impossible and politically undesirable for the Court to substitute the will of the legislature and 
to impose a fully fledged home State control. What the Court does, however, is that it stresses 
the cooperation duty between the Member States’ authorities, in order to ensure an enhanced 
application of the principle of mutual recognition.  
This last development, together with all the others presented above, substantiated by 
hundreds of judgments of the ECJ, underpin the desirability some general legislative text in 
the field of services. Further, the pursuance of the Lisbon Agenda, expressly requires action 
in this same field. These factors put together explain the initiative of the Commission which 
eventually led to the adoption of Directive 2006/123/EC on services in the internal market 
(hereinforth: ‘the services Directive’ or ‘the Directive’).121  
 
2. A modest but not insignificant regulatory attempt: the services directive 2006/123 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The services Directive is the text of secondary legislation the most widely and most 
passionately discussed in the history of the EU. It has been adopted after two years of fierce 
negotiations between the three poles of the EU legislature, animated by massive 
demonstrations in Brussels, Strasbourg, Paris and elsewhere and relayed by hundreds of 
news articles. Further, the negotiations for its adoption have (wrongly) been associated to the 
failed Constitutional Treaty. The text finally adopted marks a neat retreat compared to the 
(over-)ambitious proposal of the Commission.122 The Commission intended to regulate with 
one single horizontal text all services not covered by sector-specific legislation. The way to do 
that would be through the implementation of the country of origin principle (CoOP), by virtue 
of which service providers would offer their services in all member states, according to the 
rules applicable in their own. Both the above ambitions (universality of the text, CoOP) have 
‘hit the rock’ of the European Parliament and have been partly or wholly abandoned. The fact 
that the Directive has indeed a modest regulatory content (2.2.) should not mask, 
nonetheless, that it offers precious new instruments for the governance of the service 
economy (2.3). 
                                                          
119 This case contains the bolder statement of the duty of cooperation between Member States fiscal authorities, but 
almost all recent tax cases follow the same logic. 
120 Council Directive 77/799/EEC of 19 December 1977 concerning mutual assistance by the competent authorities of 
the Member States in the field of direct taxation, OJ 1977 L 336, p. 15. 
121 Directive 2006/123, of the EP and the Council, of 12 December 2006, OJ [2006] L 376/36. 
122 COM (2004) 2 final, of 13 January 2004. 
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2.2. A modest regulatory content – in retreat from the case law? 
 
From the more-than-a-hundred modifications forced by the European Parliament on the 
Commission’s draft, the single most important one is the abandonment of the country of origin 
principle (CoOP) in favour of the imprecise ‘free provision of services’ principle (2.2.1). The 
important increase of the activities which are excluded from the scope of the Directive is the 
second most striking feature (2.2.2). 
 
2.2.1. Free movement of services v CoOP 
 
The CoOP has received a lot of, often misplaced, attention. Not only have politicians and 
journalists used the concept according to their respective agendas, but also legal writers are 
in pains finding some common ground concerning this principle.  
First, the role of the CoOP as a rule of conflict of laws is highly controversial: some qualify the 
CoOP as a brand new rule of conflicts specific to the provision of services;123 others see it as 
a mere exception to traditional conflict of law rules, applicable only when these rules end up in 
seriously obstructing the free movement of services; 124 others, finally, only identify a 
substantive rule, completely foreign to private international law. 125 
Second, the grounding of the CoOP in the Treaty is also disputed: some writers think that it is 
inherent in Article 49 (together with Article 10) EC; 126 on the opposite side are those who 
think that the CoOP is not to be found into the Treaty, but need to be specifically provided for 
by some text of secondary legislation,127 which need be adequately motivated and have 
limited scope. 128  
A third disputed issue is whether the Directive in its current version has completely dropped 
the CoOP,129 or whether to the contrary, it has just dissimulated it under less shocking 
terms.130 
Fourth, and most importantly, the very content of the CoOP is unclear. It is this last 
uncertainty which explains, to our eyes, all the previous ones. This is why some further 
developments on the origins and the content of the CoOP follow. 
 
2.2.1.1. The genesis of the CoOP  
 
A point in which all writers do agree is that the CoOP finds its source of inspiration in the case 
law of the Court in Van Binsbergen and Cassis de Dijon. In these two judgments, and the 
following Commission Communication,131 the idea was clearly put forward, that services or 
goods which are lawfully provided or marketed in their home country should be free to cross 
the borders of the EU. Since then, however, much more has happened. For one thing, the 
Court has recognised to the principle of mutual trust 132 and to that of mutual recognition,133 
the status of a general principles of EC law. Moreover, the EC Institutions have had recourse 
to the ‘new approach’, followed by the ‘global approach’ of legislation, in order to regulate the 
internal market; in both approaches the home state regulation of the producer/provider 
occupies a pivotal role. Thirdly, several sector-specific pieces of legislation have put to work 
variants of the CoOP. However, the version of the CoOP put forward by the Directive was 
                                                          
123 See O. de Schutter and St. Francq, ‘La proposition de directive relative aux services dans le marché intérieur : 
reconnaissance mutuelle, harmonisation et conflits des lois dans l’Europe élargie’, (2005) CDE 603-660 ; p. 640. 
124 See M. Audit, ‘Régulation du marché intérieur et libre circulation des lois’ (2006) JTDI  p. 1333-1363. 
125 See for a brief presentation of this idea, with further bibliographic references, M. Wilderspin, ‘Que reste-t-il du 
principe du pays d’origine ? Le regard des internationalistes’ (6/2007) Europe p. 26-28. 
126 See M.-D. Garabiol-Furet, ‘La directive Bolkenstein, bouc émissaire d’une Europe incertaine’ (2005) RMUE p. 
295-302, 295 ; see also P. Pellegrino, ‘Directive sur les services dans le marché intérieur, Un accouchement dans 
la douleur’ (2007) RMUE 14-21, p. 17. 
127 See O. de Schutter et St. Francq, above n. 123, p. 606 ; S. Micossi, ‘Fixing the Services Directive’ CEPS Policy 
Brief 100/2006, p. 7. 
128 B. de Witte, Setting the Scene : How did Services get to Bolkenstein and Why ?, EUI working papers, Law 
2007/70, at http://cadmus.iue.it/dspace/bitstream/1814/6929/1/LAW_2007_20.pdf. 
129 See M. Wilderspin, above n. 125, Micossi above, the House of Lords, Completing the Internal Market in Services, 
Report with Evidence, 6th Report of Session 2005-6, p. 63-74. 
130 See P. Pellegrino above n. 126, p. 18 ; see also C. Kleiner, ‘La conception des règles de droit international privé 
dans la directive services’ in (6/2007) Europe 48-54. 
131 OJ (1980) C 256/2. 
132 Ever since Case 25/88 Bouchara, [1989] ECR 1105. 
133 This has been a more complicated process, for which see V. Hatzopoulos above n. 104 p. 116 et seq. 
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indeed different from all the previous ones. If we try to systematise the above, we can 
distinguish three generations of the CoOP in the legislative practice of the EC. 
The first generation is constituted by the so called ‘passport’ directives in the field of 
insurance, banking and financial services. These are based on a clear distinction between, on 
the one hand, authorisation requirements and, on the other hand, operation conditions.134 The 
former are put under the ‘home country control’, and any authorisation delivered by the home 
State is a valid ‘passport’ for entering the market in any other State. The operation conditions, 
however, remain subject to control of the host State, where the operator has to respect all 
applicable regulations. Moreover, in order to foster mutual trust on the authorisations thus 
delivered, the directives proceed to some substantial harmonisation, at two levels. Are 
harmonised not only the minimal levels of liquidity and of solvability of the undertakings, but 
also the rules concerning the keeping and publishing of accounts.135 Therefore, this first 
generation of the CoOP, based on the home country control, was restricted in two ways: first, 
it only concerned the access to – not the exercise of – any given activity; second it 
presupposed substantial harmonisation. 
The second generation of CoOP was clearly more ambitious. First and foremost, it was not 
restricted to the authorisation but also concerned the operation of service providers in other 
Member States. What is more, it only imposed minimal harmonisation. This second 
generation of CoOP has been put to work for the first time in the 1997 modification of the ‘TV 
without frontiers’ Directive. 136 The ‘electronic signature’137 and the ‘e-commerce’ 138 Directives 
have followed suite, followed themselves by the recent Directive on data protection in the field 
of electronic communications.139 All these directives contain an ‘internal market’ clause 
whereby ‘Member States shall ensure freedom of reception and shall not restrict 
retransmissions on their territory of television broadcasts from other Member States for 
reasons which fall within the fields coordinated by this Directive’ 140. An ‘internal market 
clause’ is also to be found in the draft Directive on credit agreements for consumers.141 
Besides the ‘internal market clause’ all these directives share some important common 
features: a) they do suppose some prior harmonisation; b) they all contain detailed rules 
allowing to determine the country of establishment of any given operator, in order to avoid 
settings which would amount to an abuse of rights; c) their scope is precisely defined and 
filled with permanent exceptions or temporal derogations and, more important of all, d) they 
all concern services which are provided at a distance, without the provider physically moving 
to any other Member State. Therefore, the powers the directives confer to the home state 
authorities, both to deliver the authorisation and to control the operation of undertakings 
concerned, come as no surprise. 
Compared to the above two generations of CoOP, the one put forward by the draft Directive 
clearly constituted a third generation, in at least three respects. First and foremost, because it 
was deemed to govern not only the authorisation and operation conditions of the service 
activity, but also because it would also determine the applicable law, in case of dispute. 
Hence the totality of the service provision (authorisation, operation, conflict resolution) was to 
be covered by it. This difference also justifies the evolution of terminology from ‘home country 
control’ mainly used in the field of passport directives to the more far-reaching ‘country of 
origin principle’. Second, the draft Directive had an extremely large scope of application, by 
no means restricted to services offered at a distance. Third, the level of harmonisation put 
forward by the draft Directive was so elementary, that one could legitimately question whether 
                                                          
134 It is true that in practice such a distinction is not always easy to draw, see e.g. Case C-347/02, Commission v. 
France, Insurance, [2004] ECR I-7557. 
135 For a more detailed account of the ‘passport’ system see E. Lomnicka, ‘The Home Country Control Principle in the 
Financial Services Directives and the Case Law’ (2000) EBLRev, p. 324-336 and V. Hatzopoulos, above n. 104 p. 
413-450. 
136 Directive 97/36/EC of the EP and the Council of 30 June 1997 modifying Directive 89/552/CEE on the coordination 
of certain provisions laid down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States concerning the 
pursuit of television broadcasting activities, ‘Directive TV without frontiers’, (1997) OJ L 202/60. 
137 Directive 1999/93/EC of the EP and the Council of 13 December 1999, on a Community framework for electronic 
signatures, (2000) OJ L 13/12. 
138 Directive 2000/31/EC of the EP and the Council of 8 June 2000, on certain legal aspects of information society 
services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market ('Directive on electronic commerce'), (2000) OJ L 
178/1. 
139 Directive 2002/58/EC of the EP and the Council of 12 July 2002, for data protection in electronic communications 
(2002) OJ L 201/37; this Directive replaces Directive 97/66/EC. 
140 Directive ‘TV without frontiers’, art. 2a para. 1. 
141 COM (2005) 483 final/2, of 23.11.2005, Art. 21(2). 
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the very term of harmonisation is appropriate.142 These three differences have stood on the 
way of this third generation of CoOP to flourish. 
 
2.2.1.2. Abandonment of the HCC principle 
 
The CoOP put forward by the draft Directive, without being entirely new, constituted a clear 
departure from previous regulatory methods used for the internal market. This is the reason 
why its promoters had devised various means to ensure its smooth application (2.2.1.2.1). 
Nevertheless, in view of the real or imaginary dangers it presented for the European social 
model, the CoOP had to be dropped altogether (2.2.1.2.2). 
 
How it should function  
 
Three series of provisions, within the draft Directive, should help fine-tune the CoOP’s 
innovative character. 
a) First, there were important exceptions to the CoOP’s application, both of a permanent 
and of a transitional nature (proposal, Articles 17 and 18, respectively), as well as of an 
individual character for activities related to public order and public health (proposal, Article 
19). 
Concerning permanent exceptions two remarks should be made. First, most services of 
general economic interest now enumerated in article 17(1) were also excluded in the draft.  
However in the draft were excluded the individual services listed, and not all services of 
general economic interest as a comprehensive category. Second, and more interestingly, the 
draft provided for three extremely important exceptions from the CoOP: were excluded all 
consumer contracts (Article 17(21)), the cases where the parties in any given contract had 
expressly chosen the applicable rules (Article 17(20)) and the extra-contractual (tort) liability 
of the service provider in case of accident (Article 17(23)). Therefore, at the horizontal level 
(i.e. in the relationships between private parties), the CoOP, would only apply to business to 
business (B2B) relationships and only to the extent that the parties involved had not 
expressed their will to the contrary. Therefore, all the ‘pain and suffering’ that the CoOP was 
supposed to deliver to weak and helpless consumers had nothing to do with the text of the 
Directive – except for problems arising in sub contracting situations. Third, the CoOP would 
not apply to posted workers (proposal, Articles 24-25). These are few clarifications which 
show how much the public debate has been misleading. 
b) Moreover, the draft Directive foresaw minimal harmonization of several aspects of 
service provision. Hence, in the Chapter ‘quality of services’ minimal requirements of 
information, publicity etc were imposed on service providers by their home States. In the 
same vain, the Chapter ‘convergence programme’ put forward some soft harmonization, in 
the form of community codes of conduct, while further harmonization was foreseen in 
identified activities.  
c) Last but not least, the draft Directive put into place quite elaborate mechanisms for 
administrative cooperation between national authorities, in order to ensure the effective 
application of the CoOP.143  
 
Where it could fail 
 
Despite the above precautions, the CoOP was not risk-free in, at least, three ways. 
a) First, because the CoOPs application requires close cooperation between the authorities of 
the home and host States. Indeed, since the supervision of the service provider lies with the 
home State authorities, these have to work closely together with their counterparts in the host 
State, not only for the exchange of information, but also in order to secure operational 
cooperation. However, experience shows that such cooperation is not always an easy task, 
despite the parties’ ‘best intentions’. Hence, cooperation procedures provided for in texts as 
fundamental as Regulation 1408/71 on the coordination of social security systems, or as 
specific as Directive 77/799144 on the cooperation in fiscal matters, still prove to be 
                                                          
142 For the harmonisation put forward by the Directive see below 2.3.1.2. 
143 For these see below at 2.3. 
144 Directive 77/799/EEC of the Council of 19 December 1977, concerning mutual assistance by the competent 
authorities of the Member States in the field of direct taxation (1977) OJ L 336/15. 
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problematic and call for the Court’s interpretative intervention.145 Therefore, the application of 
the CoOP could be source of tensions between the Member States’ authorities and of 
inefficiencies detrimental to consumers.  
b) Second, the application of the CoOP as a rule of conflict of laws concerning the provider’s 
liability may also be detrimental to consumers. Traditional conflict of laws rules are conceived 
to protect the weaker party. To this effect they contain basic rules (such as the application of 
the law of the country where the service is provided, typically the consumer’s state146- and the 
competence of the jurisdictions of this same State).147 Extensive exceptions further refine 
these basic rules in order to account for the different factual situations, but (almost) always 
with the aim of protecting the weak. The CoOP, on the contrary, would be a monolithical rule 
which would suffer no exceptions other than the ones specifically provided for in the proposal. 
What is more, it would reverse the traditional weighing of interests: prevalence is given to the 
service providers who can henceforth, deploy their activities without bothering to adapt their 
services and/or methods to the host State legislation. This has considerable economic 
advantages for providers as they save both on information and on adaptation costs. Further, it 
may also benefit the economy as a whole.148 However, this is a ‘zero sum operation’ whereby 
the providers’ gains are consumers’ losses, since the latter will have to defend their interests, 
in case of dispute, before the jurisdictions and according to the laws of another Member 
State.149 Such a transfer of risks is not necessarily inadmissible.150 However, it corresponds to 
a purely political choice and may not come about as a mere ‘collateral damage’ to a technical 
rule for services in the internal market. This last point hides an extra difficulty : since the 
CoOP would only apply to services, what would happen to ‘mixed’ contracts where goods and 
services are intertwined and how would cross-provision of services be regulated? 
c) Third, the application of the CoOP would lead to regulatory competition between the 
Member States,151 and could end up in race to the bottom and social dumping. This risk is 
now more present than in the past, for at least three reasons. 
Firstly, economic reasons. Member States participating in (or getting ready for) the EURO 
have lost command of both their monetary policies and of demand side policies, since 
spending is contained by the Stability and Growth Pact. Therefore, the only means to face 
negative economic conjecture is through demand side policies, i.e. increasing production 
and/or decreasing costs. Cutting down on social protection costs is the easiest way to cut 
down total cost. If one Member State engages aggressively in such direction other States will 
have to follow.  
Secondly, political reasons.  In a Union of numerous and highly heterogeneous member 
States, sharing few points in common it pays up to cheat on ones’ partners, be it for a limited 
period.152 Member States are tempted to maintain what they consider to be their ‘competitive 
advantage’ for as long as possible, at the cost of ignoring common policies. The derogations 
negotiated and the violations inflicted to the common rules opening up the utilities markets, 
offer a good illustration of the above point. The persistence of several states in violating the 
Stability and Growth pact, offers yet another very strong illustration.  
Thirdly, reasons more directly linked to the enlargement of the EU. The recent enlargements 
have conferred European citizenship to some millions of low-wage and low social protection 
workers – subject to an optional transitional period of seven years at most. Therefore, rhetoric 
                                                          
145 See cases IKA c Ioannidis and Danner, both cited above n. 114 and 28 respectively. 
146 Rome Convention of 1980, OJ [1998] 27/34, Art. 4. 
147 Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of the Council of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments in civil and commercial matters, (2001) OJ L 12/1, Art. 5(1)b. 
148 See House of Lords n. 129 above. 
149 For this idea of ‘passing the bucket’ see among many, M. Audit, above. n. 124, p. 1353 et seq., and O. de Schutter 
and S. Francq, above n. 123, p. 640 et seq. 
150 See e.g. the British House of Lords, in the report cited above n. 129, which clearly values the development of 
commercial transactions, in particular by small and medium enterprises, while it passes under silence the negative 
consequences for consumers. 
151 Concerning the issue of regulatory competition see, among many, M. Audit, above n. 124; V. Mayer-Schönberger 
and A. Somek, ‘Introduction : Governing Regulatory Interaction : the Normative Question’ (2006) ELJ 431-439 ; P. 
Zumbansen, ‘Spaces and Places : A Systems Theory Approach to Regulatory Competition in European Company 
Law’ (2006) ELJ 534-556; and in a more general way, C. Barnard and S. Deakin, ‘Market Access and Regulatory 
Competition’ Jean Monnet Working Paper n. 9/2001 available 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01/012701.html  ainsi que F. Scharpf, « Introduction : The Problem 
Solving Capacity of Multi-level Governance » (1997) JEPP 520-538. 
152 In this sense S. Collignon, in his oral presentation in the CEPS commemorative conference for the 50 years of the 
Treaty of Rome, ‘From Rome to Berlin’, Madrid, 19-20 juin 2007. 
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trickeries like that of the ‘polish plumber’ menacing local service providers easily hit the bull’s 
eye. 
Therefore, the applicable standard remains the Court’s imperfect country of origin principle, 
with all its shortcomings and limitations.153 
 
2.2.2. Exclusions 
 
The conciliation procedure has left its traces both on the length and on the clarity of the 
Directive. The European Parliament’s main additions, both at the recital and at the 
substantive level, all tend to limit the Directive’s scope of application. The end result is a text 
which is quite clear on what it does NOT regulate, but quite ambiguous as to what it does 
regulate. This general negativism which has led some authors to treat the text of ‘anti-
legislation’,154 impregnates the very structure of the Directive (2.2.2.1). Some exclusions merit 
special attention (2.2.2.2). 
 
2.2.2.1. Anti-legislation ? 
 
The Directive contains long series of exceptions, both to its general scope (2.2.2.1.1) and to 
some of the specific rules it establishes (2.2.2.1.2). 
 
Exceptions to the scope of the Directive 
 
The very first Article of the Directive which is supposed to describe its ‘object’ (a single phrase 
of 28 words in the draft proposal) is a long list of seven paragraphs (423 words) in which we 
are told of things the Directive ‘does not deal with’, ‘does not affect’ etc:155 liberalisation of 
services of general economic interest, b) abolition of service monopolies, c) protection of 
cultural and linguistic diversity, d) penal law, e) labour law, f) fundamental rights.  
Article two, describing the ‘scope’ of the Directive contains a further list of activities (not entire 
sectors, like in the previous article) which are excluded from the Directive’s scope.156 These 
activities range from services of general non economic interest, social and healthcare 
services to transport and financial services and to gambling and private security activities. 
There is no apparent logical link underpinning the various excluded activities, other that they 
were the ones best represented in Brussels…157 
Article three of the Directive further limits its scope of application, this time in a very 
understandable way. It is foreseen that other sector-specific legislative texts, such as the 
posted workers Directive,158 the TV without frontiers Directive,159 the recent professional 
qualifications Directive160 or Regulation 1408/71 on the coordination of social security 
systems, 161 are not affected by the Directive. And the list is not exhaustive. 
Only after this prelude of exclusions, non affectations etc, does Article four of the Directive 
give the definitions to be followed in the Directive. 
 
Exceptions to the free provision of services principle 
 
Article 16 of the Directive were to be the core Directive provision, as it introduced the 
ambitious CoOP. This has now been replaced by the modest principle of ‘freedom to provide 
                                                          
153 See above 1.3. 
154 Ph. Manin, ‘Conclusions’ on Directive 2006/123/EC, (6/2007) Europe, p. 29-30, 29. 
155 It is worth noting that in the French version of the text, para. 6 of the said provision introduces a third variation, 
according to which the Directive ‘does not apply’ to labour law etc, while the English version sticks to the terms 
‘does not affect’. 
156 Taxation, an entire sector (which should have been moved to Article 1 after its modification by the EP) is also 
excluded from the scope of the Directive by virtue of Art. 2. 
157 This view seems to be confirmed if we compare the text finally adopted with the one proposed, which only 
contained three exceptions. 
158 Directive 96/71/EC of the EP and the Council, of 16 December 1996, concerning the posting of workers in the 
framework of the provision of services (1997) OJ L 18/1. 
159 Directive 89/552/EEC of the Council of 3 October 1989, on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by 
Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting 
activities (1989) OJ L 298/23. 
160 Directive 2005/36/EC of the EP and the Council of 7 September 2005, on the recognition of professional 
qualifications (2005) OJ L 255/22. 
161 Regulation 1408/71/EEC of the Council of 14 June 1971, on the application of social security schemes to 
employed persons and their families moving within the Community (1971) OJ L 149/2. 
 20
services’. This unclear principle has been further limited in scope by the adjunction of three 
paragraphs to Article 16. Therefore, paragraph 1 poses the principle that ‘Member States 
shall respect the right of providers to provide services in a Member State other than that in 
which they are established’. Immediately thereafter in the same paragraph, however, it is 
stated that the above principle does not rule out restrictive measures which are non-
discriminatory, necessary and proportional for the attainment of some objective of public 
policy, public security, public health or the protection of the environment.162 If this were not 
clear enough, paragraph 3 of this same provision reiterates that these same reasons may 
justify the adoption of restrictive measures by the host State.163 Therefore, Article 16 of the 
Directive is nothing more than a codification of the Court’s jurisprudence on Article 49 EC.164 
Article 17 of the Directive has the suggestive title ‘Additional derogations from the freedom to 
provide services’. This provision is difficult to understand after the abandonment of the CoOP. 
Article 17 made sense when it served to exclude from the far-reaching CoOP some activities 
judged sensible or inappropriate for that type of regulation. Now that Article 16 is restricted to 
codifying the Court’s case law – subject to express exceptions – it is legally unclear what 
does Article 17 stand for.  
Article 18 of the Directive foresees the possibility of ‘case-by-case derogations’ by measures 
relating to the safety of services. According to this provision, Member States may adopt 
restrictive measures following the mutual assistance procedure foreseen in Article 35 of the 
Directive. Such measures may only be adopted provided that there is no EC harmonisation in 
the field concerned and that they have some added value in relation to the rules applicable in 
provider’s the home State. This provision also made sense in the original draft of the 
Directive, but much less now: since Member States are authorised by Article 16 (1st and 3d 
paras) to introduce restrictions for the protection of public policy, security, health and the 
environment, it is difficult to see why they would have recourse to the more restrictive and 
technical rule of Article 18.  
Last but not least, the fact that the Directive expressly provides for exceptions to the free 
provision of services for the four reasons mentioned above (public policy, order, health and 
the environment) raises two issues. First, the Directive uses the three Treaty-based grounds 
for exceptions together with one which is judge-made. This is not only a conceptual shift 
(already identified several years ago in the Court’s case law), 165 but has also substantial 
implications. According to the Court’s case law Treaty-based exceptions may justify both 
discriminatory and non-discriminatory measures. Article 16 of the Directive, nonetheless, may 
serve to uphold only non-discriminatory measures. Second, and more importantly, the four 
reasons listed in Article 16 as justifying restrictions to the free provision of services are 
different from the more inclusive category of ‘overriding reasons relating to the public interest’ 
defined in Article 4(8) of the Directive and used in other parts of it (especially concerning 
establishment of service providers). Should this mean that within the scope of the Directive, 
Member States may only invoke these four grounds to justify restrictions of a non-
discriminatory nature, while the other judge-made ‘overriding reasons’ become inapplicable? 
Such an interpretation could be valid only if we admitted that the Directive fully harmonises 
the free provision of services – a claim which is certainly not true.166 
 
2.2.2.2. Activity-specific exclusions and derogations  
 
Services of general interest 
 
Following the 2004 White Paper ‘On Services of General Interest’167 the Directive makes clear 
that this general category may be broken into two: services of general (non-economic) 
interest, on the one hand and services of general economic interest, on the other.168  
                                                          
162 It is worth noting that the ‘public policy’ ground seems much more comprehensive in the English text than in the 
French where reference is made to ‘ordre public’ 
163 It is difficult to understand why the EP insisted on both provisions being inserted to Article 16, since they seem to 
set the same rule and create confusion. 
164 Subject to one eventual and unclear difference concerning exceptions, for which see above 1.2. 
165 On the relationship between Treaty-based and judge-made exceptions see V. Hatzopoulos, ‘Exigences 
essentielles, impératives ou impérieuses: une théorie, des théories ou pas de théorie du tout?’ (1998) RTDEur, p. 
191-236. 
166 See also Ch. Lemaire, ‘La directive, la liberté d’établissement et la libre prestation de services. Confirmations, 
innovations’ (2/2007) Europe, p. 15-26, 21. 
167 COM (2004) 374 final, du 12 mai 2004. 
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The former completely evade the application of the Directive, according to article 2(2)a. This 
is yet another provision added during the political negotiation leading to the adoption of the 
Directive, another senseless provision. Following the terms of article 50, the Treaty rules only 
apply to commercial services, offered for remuneration. The Court’s case law is fixed on this 
point.169 It has been observed above that the court uses imprecise criteria and a very large 
concept of remuneration in order to ascertain the commercial nature of any given service.170 
One may criticize the Court for its laxist attitude in this respect.171 However, this does not 
justify the inclusion in the Directive of a provision stating the obvious.172 
The added value of the Directive is also unclear in relation to services of general economic 
interest. Some, such as telecommunications, transport and healthcare are altogether 
excluded from the Directive’s scope (Article 2(2)). Those which do come within the Directives 
scope are, nonetheless, altogether excluded from the free provision of services provided for in 
article 16 (see Article 17(1)).173 Therefore, the only way in which the Directive may affect the 
provision of services of general economic interest is through enhanced administrative 
cooperation and procedural simplification.174 This end result corresponds to a great extent to 
the Court’s preexisting case law, but for the underlying logic. It is reminded that the Court 
does respect the Member States’ choices for financing services of general economic interest, 
subject to a lose proportionality control – not in the blanket way suggested by the exclusion of 
such services from Article 17(1) of the Directive.175 Here again, the tension between general 
principles recognized by the ECJ, such as proportionality and non-discrimination and the 
simplistic solutions adopted by the Directive becomes apparent. 
 
Healthcare 
  
The way the Court has stretched Article 49 EC in order to include healthcare services has 
been discussed above. Under these circumstances, the exclusion of healthcare services from 
the scope of the Directive does not seem to matter much. From a normative point of view, the 
only added value of the proposed Article 23 of the draft Directive would be to introduce the 
criterion of overnight stay as a means of distinguishing between outpatient/hospital 
treatments.  
However, because of the peculiar nature of healthcare, its exclusion from the Directive may 
adversely affect patients rights. First, while administrative cooperation is crucial in this field,176 
national authorities miss the opportunity to closely cooperate within the Directive framework. 
Second, patients miss all the very precious information which would be made available to 
them through the single points of contact, the electronic information systems etc. Third, 
patients cannot benefit from the warranties the Directive offers to service recipients.177 Fourth, 
national insurance funds and hospitals will find it easier to ignore previous judgments of the 
ECJ delivered in other cases, rather than a text of national law transposing the Directive.178 
All the above factors are likely to adversely affect patient mobility. The above explain why the 
European Parliament, after having insisted for the removal of healthcare from the Directive,179 
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in a report of May 10th, 2007 ‘invites the Commission to submit, to Parliament, a proposal to 
reintroduce health services into Directive 2006/123/EC, and a proposal to codify European 
Court of Justice rulings on European patients’ rights’.180 The ensuing Resolution, however, 
only took up the need for codification.181 
 
Other excluded activities : playing with legal certainty? 
 
The fact that many economic activities are outside the scope of the Directive raises two series 
of questions. First, the horizontal and general character of the Directive may appear to be 
more of a legal fiction, in view of the number and the economic importance of the excluded 
services: financial services, telecommunications, energy, transport, TV services, health care, 
gambling and gaming etc. Therefore, the Directive’s impact in relaunching the internal market 
and in promoting the Lisbon objectives, may not be as important as it was thought of by its 
promoters. Second, in view of the fact that the Directive essentially codifies the Court’s case 
law in the field of services, any exclusion from the scope of the Directive may be source of 
legal uncertainty. This may be illustrated by reference to two activities which have been 
recurring before the Court in these recent years.  
a) Gambling and gaming 
In Schindler, Zenatti, Läära and Anomar,182 the Court has recognised that gambling is a 
service falling under Article 49 EC, but has shown extreme tolerance towards national 
restrictions thereto. The Court’s ‘self-restraint’ takes the form of restricted proportionality 
control of the measures at stake 183 and is explained by the idea that ‘moral, religious and 
cultural factors, and the morally and financially harmful consequences for the individual and 
society associated with gaming and betting, could serve to justify the existence on the part of 
the national authorities of a margin of appreciation’.184 However, two recent cases concerning 
the Italian gambling market, mark a clear evolution of the Court’s attitude. In Gambelli the 
Court held a concession system which restricted access to the gambling market to violate 
Article 49. Such a restriction could not be upheld, unless it could be shown to contribute in a 
‘coherent and systematic’185 way with the rest of the applicable legislation, to the attainment of 
the set objectives of general interest (consumer protection, fraud prevention, limitation of 
spending propensity). This was an issue for the referring jurisdiction to decide. A couple of 
years later, in Placanica the Court really took the situation in its hand. It held that a system of 
limited concessions could be justified in view of the above-mentioned grounds of general 
interest. It went on to state, however, that concessions should be given out following a tender 
procedure, having ‘detailed procedural rules to ensure the protection of the rights which those 
operators derive by direct effect of Community law.186 Making a step further the Court even 
held that ‘appropriate courses of action could be the revocation and redistribution of the old 
licences or the award by public tender of an adequate number of new licences’.187 In the 
same logic, in Lindman,188 the Court had no hesitations in condemning the Finnish taxation 
scheme, which discriminated among proceedings of luck-games, on the basis of the place the 
game was organized.189 
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Under these circumstances, the exclusion of gambling from the Directive’s scope does not 
entail freedom of action for Member States.190 It is true that Member States are not under the 
cooperation and transparency obligations foreseen by the Directive. They need, however, to 
comply with the much stricter conditions of the judgment in Placanica: if they restrict the 
number of market participants, they need to put into place a tendering system respectful of 
the general procurement principles: transparency, non discrimination, proportionality and 
mutual recognition.191  Therefore, the judgment in Placanica, through its radical content and 
the timing of its publication clearly constitutes a judicial revision of the unsatisfactory text of 
the Directive. 
b) Private security services 
The same may be said in relation to private security services, also excluded from the 
Directive’s scope by Article 2(2)k. In a series of recent judgments192 the Court has held 
private security activities to fall under Article 49 EC and not to be exempt by virtue of Article 
45, on the exercise of public authority.193 Hence, the Court has held Article 49 EC to be 
violated by a) requirements concerning the legal form of security undertakings, b) special 
qualifications required by their directors, c) the requirement of a permanent presence within 
the national territory, d) the need for special (identity) documents and even e) the conditions 
for issuing the authorisation necessary for their operation, if such conditions are already 
satisfied by the undertaking under the home State regulation.194  
In this way the Court does more than just ‘opening up’ the market. It requires national 
administrations to cooperate closely and to fully embrace the principle of mutual recognition. 
Therefore, once again, the Court makes it up for the legislator’s hesitancy.  
 
2.2.2.3. Posted workers: another false dilemma 
 
The treatment of posted workers under the Directive has been an even deadlier battlefield 
than the CoOP, where the opponents of the draft Directive won yet another victory over its 
promoters. Since the judgments of the Court in Evi  c/ Seco, Van der Elst et Rush 
Portuguesa195, it is established case law that a service provider may move to another Member 
State with his personnel. Three principles stem from the above cases: a) the service provider 
may move to any Member State with his own personnel, irrespectively of their nationality, 
without having to comply with all the requirements of the host State concerning the entry and 
working conditions of foreign workers; b) the service provider may, nevertheless, be required 
to conform himself with the labour law rules applicable in the host State (concerning working 
time, paid leaves, minimal salaries, 196 health and security regulations, pregnant workers etc – 
but not hiring/firing conditions and not social security and complementary pension 
schemes);197, c) this notwithstanding, the service provider may not be required to comply with 
all the labour law formalities of the host State in respect of his own workers, unless such 
formalities substantially add up to the protection of workers. Directive 96/71 takes up and 
builds upon these through a system of ‘cooperation on information’ between the competent 
authorities (Article 4). This system, however, has proven moderately effective198 and the draft 
Directive was intended to push further in the direction of free movement.  
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Contrary to the understanding misleadingly spread by the media, the draft Directive did not 
apply the CoOP to posted workers. On the contrary, it expressly stated that the CoOP did not 
affect neither Directive 96/71 nor Regulation 1408/71 on social security. What the Directive 
did is that in a Section named ‘posted workers’  it contained two Articles: Article 24 intended 
to strengthen the administrative cooperation between the competent national authorities, 
while Article 25 was intended to tame national immigration rules in relation to posted 
workers.199 The logic underlying both provisions was to transfer some competences from the 
host to the home authorities, while building up confidence between the two.200 These have 
been abandoned and the Directive has been altogether declared inapplicable to posted 
workers (in at least three points in the text: Article 1(6), 3(1)b and 17!).  
Therefore, posted workers continue to be governed by (the relatively ineffective) Directive 
96/71 and by the case law of the Court.  If we give a closer look to the Court’s case law as it 
currently stands we shall realise that the situation is equally unsatisfactory for ‘nationalistic 
trade-unionists’ and for ‘globalised neo-liberals’ alike. 
In its more recent case law the Court has been more accommodating of economic 
imperatives and of the desire of service providers to move around wit their own personnel. 
Therefore, in a first series of judgments the Court has applied its own jurisprudence and the 
principles of Directive 96/71 in an energetic, and yet contained, way. Without putting at stake 
the principle that the host State legislation should apply, the Court has held contrary to Article 
49 EC and/or the Directive the obligation imposed by the host State to a service provider a) to 
keep all the documents required by the host’s State labour legislation,201 b) to pay social 
security contributions in the host State on behalf of workers who are already insured in the 
home State,202 c) to obtain individual working permits for every posted worker, 203 and d) to 
have working visas delivered under technical conditions difficult to fulfill.204  
In a second series of cases, however, the Court has openly questioned the full application of 
the host State legislation, at three levels. 
a) At the administrative level, the Court has held that where the service provider is subject to 
a prior authorisation requirement such authorisation ‘should neither delay nor complicate the 
exercise of the right of persons established in another Member State to provide their 
services’.205 Concerning a registration requirement, the Court held that ‘the authorisation 
procedure instituted by the host Member State should neither delay nor complicate the 
exercise of the right of persons established in another Member State to provide their services 
on the territory of the first State where examination of the conditions governing access to the 
activities concerned has been carried out and it has been established that those conditions 
are satisfied’.206 The above findings imply that the host State may be required to put into 
place simpler procedures and formalities compared to the ones concerning their own 
nationals. 
b) Concerning minimal pay, the Court has also shown clear signs of departure from the full 
and automatic application of the host State legislation. In Mazzoleni207 the question arose 
whether the personnel of a French security company occasionally deployed in sites in 
Belgium should be paid at the higher tariffs applicable in Belgium. The Court held that 
application of the host country legislation may become, under certain circumstances, neither 
necessary nor proportional.208 The necessity test requires the host State authorities to verify 
whether their national legislation is needed to ensure an ‘equivalent’ level of remuneration for 
workers, taking into account fiscal and social charges applicable in the States concerned.209 
Even if the necessity test is satisfied, the application of the host State legislation may still be 
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countered if it entails disproportionate administrative burdens for the service provider or 
inequalities between its employees (proportionality test).210 Few months later in Portugaia 
Construcoes211 the Court held that the host State’s collective agreement on salaries could be 
applied only if it contributed in a ‘significant way’ to the employees’ social protection.212 
Therefore the sacrosanct principle of the respect of host State minimal pay requirements 
becomes conditional upon a) significantly adding up to the employees’ revenue and b) not 
demeasurably burdening the employer (!).213  
c) Broadly the same principles above apply in relation to social security contributions in the 
host State, following the Court’s judgment in Finalarte.214  
From the above it becomes clear that if a risk of social dumping in relation to posted workers 
does exist, such risk is unrelated to the (draft) Directive. It is true that in some respects the 
Directive pushed further than the case law, e.g. by abolishing any authorisation, registration 
etc obligation. Closer administrative cooperation, however, foreseen by the Directive, could 
help ensure the full respect of rules of social protection for workers. The very day of the 
publication, by the Commission, of the amended draft Directive, whereby the ‘posted workers’ 
Section had been dropped, the Commission published a COM document together with a 
report by its services, pursuing broadly the same objectives,215 through soft law.  
In view of all the above, it would seem that the exclusion of ‘posted workers’ from the 
Directive is yet another victory of misinformed political will over economic necessities and 
legal certainty.  
 
2.3. But a significant step forward for the governance of the service economy 
 
Despite all its shortcomings, the Directive does, nevertheless, serve the free provision of 
services, both on substantive (2.3.1) and on procedural (2.3.2) grounds.  
 
2.3.1. Substantive amelioration  
 
2.3.1.1. Adressing mainstream restrictions 
 
Simplified procedures for the establishment of service providers 
 
One of the main inputs of the Directive – and the one least discussed by legal writers – is the 
extent to which it simplifies the establishment of service providers. Chapter III of the Directive 
(Articles 9 to 15) constitutes the first piece of legislation of a horizontal nature (i.e. not sector-
specific, such as e.g. the TV without frontiers Directive) to align the economic with the legal 
concept of services, setting aside the unhappy ‘duration criterion’ contained in Article 50 EC. 
In this it follows the Court’s case law described above in 1.1.3. Hence, it regulates situations 
which under the traditional establishment/services dichotomy fall in the former, to the extent 
that they concern service activities. This is why the Directive’s legal base is to be found not 
only in Article 55 EC on services, but also in Article 47 EC on establishment.216 
Service providers wishing to establish themselves in another Member State, have, in 
principle, to comply with the host State legislation. This requirement has been tempered, by 
the Court, through the imposition of the general principles of non-discrimination, necessity, 
proportionality and mutual recognition. Chapter III of the Directive codifies the relevant case 
law of the Court in two Sections, one concerning authorisation procedures and the other all 
other measures restricting establishment.  
Such codification does offer some clear added value. First, the codification of the case law 
into the text of a Directive – and its transcription into national law – does away with the 
casuistic character of the above-mentioned principles and brings them closer to both service 
providers and to Member States’ administrations. Second, these principles from ex post 
remedies for service providers transform themselves into ex ante obligations for national 
administrations. Third, the Directive goes beyond mere principles and offers practical details 
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for their application, something the Court may only rarely do. Fourth, Member States’ 
discretionary powers are circumscribed, to the extent that States are subject to report 
obligations concerning the restrictions maintained/imposed both to one another and to the 
Commission (Article 39 of the Directive).   
 
Supporting service recipients 
 
The Directive innovates by introducing rules in favour of service recipients. In a short Section 
consisting of three articles the Directive prohibits restrictions imposed by the home State 
(Article 19), condemns discriminatory measures liable to be adopted by the host State (Article 
20) and offers ‘assistance to recipients’ (Article 21). 
More in detail, the recipient’s home State may neither impose any authorization or declaration 
requirement nor put limits to the financial aid to which the recipient is entitled, just because 
he/she has opted for receiving a given service in another Member State. Clearly, the 
principles established in Kohll, Smits & Peerbooms and Vanbraekel underpin Article 19 of the 
Directive. Similarly, the Court’s judgments in Trojani, Collins and Bidar,217 seem to transcend 
Article 20 which prevents the host State from introducing any discriminatory measure against 
foreign service recipients. It has to be noted that – unlike Article 16 of the Directive – the 
above two provisions do not exclude from their scope of application the services of general 
economic interest. Hence, they may be invoked by nationals of one Member State in order to 
secure access to services having a social character in other Member States.  
The final provision on service recipients aims at making information accessible to recipients 
and at building up confidence for services offered in other Member States: electronic means 
of communication, single points of contact, simple guides etc, all available to the service 
recipients in their home State. 
 
2.3.1.2. Harmonisation and self-regulation  
 
Marginal Harmonisation 
 
The fact that the Directive only entails marginal harmonisation is no secret. If, however, direct 
harmonisation is indeed, very limited, the Directive sets the conditions for indirect and for 
future harmonisation. 
In the initial draft Directive, direct harmonisation was not an aim on its own, rather than a 
condition indispensable to the application of the CoOP. Now, however, we are left with 
harmonisation which, despite being narrowly targeted and limited, may nevertheless serve 
consumers. 
a) Direct (substantial) harmonisation, at the service of service recipients 
Chapter V of the Directive named ‘Quality of services’ counts six long Articles, and provides 
for common measures, often of a voluntary nature. These foresee a) the obligation for service 
providers to offer extensive information both on themselves and on the service offered 
(inspired to a large extent by Directive 85/577/CE on contracts outside commercial premises 
and 97/7/CE on distant selling),218 b) their liability and the need to take up professional 
guarantees, c) their right to use commercial communications and to set up multidisciplinary 
activities, subject to exceptions.219 Voluntary quality policies are encouraged, with emphasis 
put on certification, evaluation, labels and quality charters. Finally, extra-judicial mechanisms 
of conflict resolution are to be set up by Member States in order to ease differences between 
service providers and service recipients. It is true that all these points do not go to the core 
and only touch the periphery of service provision; it is also true, however, that they focus on 
one of the main obstacles to the development of trans-border service flows: the lack of 
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information and of confidence. By the same token, they add up to other more specific 
consumer protection rules. 
b) Indirect (procedural) harmonisation, at the service of service providers  
Further to the above direct harmonisation, the Directive also pushes forward indirect – but 
extremely important – procedural harmonisation. Chapter II of the Directive, named 
‘administrative simplification’ harmonises formalities, documents, procedures etc leading up to 
the exercise of service activities. Points of single contact will be put into place (Article 6), 
harmonised forms and documents will be used (Article 5(2)), pre-determined information will 
be at the disposition of service providers (Article 7) etc. All these provisions end up in some 
procedural harmonisation, which could be codified in a kind of a vade mecum for the setting 
up of service activities in any Member State.  
c) Future harmonisation 
The core content of the Directive is full of measures of negative integration: abolition of 
unjustified restrictions, discriminations etc. These, however, also lead to positive integration 
and de facto harmonisation: Member States obliged to give up important packages of their 
legislation, will have to replace those with measures inspired by the Directive and the Court’s 
case law. Moreover, in some instances the Directive’s rules are detailed to such a point that 
national measures implementing them will necessarily be very similar. 
Moreover, the Directive contains a couple of ‘rendez-vous (RDV) clauses’, whereby the 
Institutions and Member States are invited to reflect on further harmonisation. There is one 
sector-specific RDV clause (Article 38) of minute importance (after the European Parliament 
cut down on the bulk of the activities it would concern). Next to it, there is one general RDV 
clause, of extreme importance and sophistication, concerning the Directive as a whole 
(Articles 39-41). This should bear its fruits in 2011 and every three years thereafter.220  
Finally, the Directive has several ‘hooks’ whereby further harmonisation measures (of 
secondary importance) have to (see e.g. Articles 8(3) and 21(4)) or may be (see e.g. Articles 
5(2) and 23(4)) adopted by the Commission. 
 
Codes of conduct and other self-regulation 
 
The Directive further « harmonises » through the use of European labels, norms etc (Article 
26) and, more importantly, through the promotion of European codes of conduct (Article 37). It 
is incorrect, technically, to talk of harmonisation through measures of soft law. Such 
measures have no normative intensity whatsoever and hence are not binding and their 
normative content is freely determined by the regulatees themselves. However, it has been 
shown that soft law may be as binding as hard law and that, in certain circumstances, it may 
even ensure a higher degree of compliance. 221 Self-regulation has also proven quite effective 
both as a component of the ‘new approach’ of legislation inaugurated in 1985 and in the 
regulated network industries. Therefore, the limited harmonization pursued by the Directive is 
being completed by soft means.  
 
2.3.2. Procedural improvements  
 
Contrary to the Directive’s poor substantive content, its procedural arrangements are both 
innovative and powerful. The Directive is impregnated with modern methods of governance 
and embodies a new drafting-style directly issued from the ‘Better Lawmaking’ 
Communication222 and the ‘European Governance’ White Paper.223 The Directive’s procedural 
arrangements aim both at securing the attainment of the set objectives (2.3.2.1) and at 
ensuring its own ‘sustainability’, through its periodic revision (2.3.2.2).    
 
2.3.2.1. Procedural arrangements for the free provision of services 
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Administrative simplification 
 
Administrative simplification is one of the Directive’s main objectives. In this respect the 
techniques followed by the Directive are quite original for a text of hard law – but already well 
established as means of fostering soft cooperation among States.  
For some time now, and quite intensively since the launching of the Lisbon Agenda in 2000, 
the Commission works on the issue of administrative simplification. Building on the 
experience acquired by the OECD in this field,224 the Commission has fostered the exchange 
of best practices and benchmarking, while it has devised several indicators measuring the 
performance of national administrations. Up till now, however, all these have remained 
‘esoteric’ to the Commission and have only taken the form of working documents, internal 
reports and recommendations.225 Only in 2007 did the Commission launch action programme 
‘CUT 25’ aimed at the reduction of national administrative burden by 25% by the year 2012.226 
In the framework of this action plan the Commission proposed some legislative texts, for the 
first time in January 2007.  
Well before these texts were even proposed by the Commission, the Directive was the first 
text of a horizontal nature to put forward binding rules on administrative simplification. 
Chapter II of the Directive contains four series of rules.  
Article five asks Member States to evaluate their requirements concerning access to, and 
exercise of, service activities. If these prove not to be ‘sufficiently simple’ Member States have 
to simplify them. The fact the ‘sufficiently’ criterion is a very vague one and that the only one 
to evaluate this is the very Member State concerned, Article 5 should be seen more as a 
political engagement rather than as a legal norm.  
Articles six, seven and eight form a coherent set of rules having the potential to revolutionise 
the establishment of service providers in other Member States. The ‘best practice’ of one stop 
shops is made into a legal obligation. Hence, Member States are to put into place single 
points of contact, for service providers, with twofold responsibilities. First, these contact points 
should provide all the information foreseen in Article 7 of the Directive. Second, and more 
importantly, they should accomplish, on behalf of service providers, all necessary formalities 
and procedures giving access to the service activity concerned. This is a way around national 
bureaucracy, bearing its own dynamics for substantial simplification: when one bit of the 
national administration (the single point of contact) is to cope with the formalities of all the 
other administrative authorities, a strong incentive is given for the reduction of red tape. The 
creation of these points of single contact should considerably diminish establishment cost, 
both in terms of information collection and of setup fixed costs; small and medium enterprises 
should be the main beneficiaries. The role of points of single contact is all the more important 
after the abandonment of the CoOP, since service providers need, in principle, to comply with 
all the host State requirements. However, Member States have no real incentive to offer their 
best services to providers from other Member States, at considerable cost. Therefore, some 
monitoring system, either by the Commission or through peer-review, should secure the 
effective functioning of single points of contact.  
The Directive also makes use of the available technology and provides that all the information 
provided by the single points of contact should also be available by electronic means at a 
distance and should be regularly updated (Article 7). What is more, all the procedures and 
formalities necessary for the exercise of any service activity should be made available for 
online completion (Article 8).  
 
Administrative cooperation between Member State authorities 
 
Contrary to Chapter II (above), Chapter VI on ‘administrative cooperation’ has clearly lost in 
importance from the abandonment of the CoOP, since competence sharing and mutual help 
between home and host State authorities are now less important. However, one cannot 
dismiss altogether nine (out of 45) provisions of the Directive. Hence, the creation of one or 
more ‘liaison points’ in every Member State, responsible for the exchange of information 
                                                          
224 Several general reports, as well as national reports are available at 
http://www.oecd.org/topic/0,3373,en_2649_37421_1_1_1_1_37421,00.html.  
225 The Commission pursues administrative simplification not only at the Member States level, but also concerning its 
own legislative acts and proposals, see Commission Communication ‘Implementing the Community Lisbon 
programme : A strategy for the simplification of the regulatory environment’ COM (2005) 535 final and the first 
Report on the application of this strategy, COM (2006) 690 final .  
226 COM (2007) 23 final.  
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between national authorities will certainly help the application of the Directive (Article 28). 
Next to those, a ‘European network of Member States’ authorities’ will run an alert mechanism 
whenever it ‘becomes aware of serious specific acts or circumstances relating to a service 
activity that could cause serious damage to the health or safety of persons or to the 
environment’ (Article 32). An electronic system for the exchange of information (Article 34(1)) 
and some rules on the respective competences of the home and host State complete the 
rules on cooperation. 
 
2.3.2.2. Procedural arrangements for the revision of the Directive 
 
One of the main originalities of the Directive is that it is ‘self-sustainable’: it provides for its 
own periodic evaluation and revision. Articles 39 and 41 constitute a startling example of new 
methods of governance being introduced into more traditional regulatory instruments, such as 
the Directive at hand.227 These provisions put into place a system of successive reports which 
may eventually culminate into legislative proposals put forward by the Commission. More 
precisely, Member States have to report to the Commission on the use they have made a) of 
the discretion left to them by the Directive (articles 9§2, 15§5 et 25§3) and b) of the 
derogation on the free movement of services, contained in Article 16(3). These reports are 
circulated to other Member States for peer review. On the basis of the initial reports and the 
peers’ comments on them, the Commission is to present a synthesis report to the European 
Parliament and the Council. After all these reports have been circulated and subject to 
evaluation, the Commission shall present in 2011, for the first time, and every three years 
thereafter, to the Parliament and Council a ‘comprehensive report’ on the application of the 
Directive « accompanied, where appropriate, by proposals for amendment of this Directive» 
(article 41). 
The very fact that this complex system of cross-reporting and circular evaluation is to be 
found in a Chapter called ‘Convergence Programme’, rather than in the ‘final provisions’ of the 
Directive, talks of the Commission’s intentions. Faced with the Parliament’s dogged 
opposition and the public’s reprehension for its initial proposal, the Commission has recourse 
to successive reports and evaluations of an imperfect legal instrument. These, orchestrated 
by the Commission itself, should create further dynamism, which the Commission should be 
able steer in the direction it sees fit, in the future. By the same token, the future revision of the 
Directive is being de-politicised and transformed into a technocratic process.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Out of the numerous questions which emerge from the developments above, one stands out 
in a most compelling way: in view of the high degree of involvement of the Court in the 
construction of the internal market for services (briefly presented in part 1), does the ‘services 
Directive’, as amputated by the European Parliament (briefly presented in part 2), has any 
reason of being, does it have any added value? The answer to this question is twofold.  
For one thing, the Directive will be a source of legal complication and uncertainty. Not so 
much because it introduces new rules of law, but precisely because it does not. Instead, it 
meddles in an inconsistent and haphazard way with established principles and accepted 
rules, while providing for an interminable list of ‘exclusions’, ‘derogations’, ‘non affectations’ 
etc. Any hope for substantial positive integration went awash with the abandonment of the 
CoOP. This retreat, imposed as a political necessity, is unsatisfactory both from an economic 
and from a legal viewpoint. The economies that would accrue to service providers from not 
having to investigate in, and comply with, the legal systems of other Member States are being 
lost. At the same time, however, host State authorities are bound by a strong principle of 
mutual recognition and by compelling cooperation obligations, in unclear terms. In these 
respects, the adoption of the services Directive has added nothing, it may even qualify as a 
retreat. 
On the other, hand, however, there are at least three ways in which the Directive may be 
valued positively. First, by codifying (as well as it could) the Court’s case law, it vested the 
solutions adopted with democratic legitimacy and silenced voices complaining of judicial 
activism. Second, the Directive, does contain some rules (of secondary importance, it is true) 
leading to the simplification of procedures and to some limited harmonization. Third, the 
                                                          
227 For the issue of hybrid formations see above n. 221. 
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Directive clearly sets the conditions, both procedural and substantial, for the adoption of more 
far reaching rules, in the future. 
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